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THE CONTINUING STORM: How DISASTER RECOVERY

EXCLUDES THOSE MOST IN NEED*

JONATHAN P. HOOKS AND TRISHA B. MILLER***

I. INTRODUCTION

Most Americans have emblazoned in their memory an image of a
category five hurricane roaring across the Gulf Coast of Louisiana,
* This essay is published in the California Western Law Review along with other
Essays from the 2006 Western Law Professors of Color Conference, entitled "Pale
Promises: Confronting the Rights Deficit."
** The 1961 photograph is by Declan Haun and is used with the permission of
the Chicago History Museum (ICHi-35488). The 2005 photograph is by David
Bacon and is used with the permission of Street Spirit.
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Mississippi, and Alabama, hurling casinos in the air, crumbling
century-old buildings, and devastating thousands of homes-and even
more lives-under a massive tidal surge.' When Katrina made
landfall, it instantly became the worst natural disaster in over 200
In Mississippi, it destroyed 70,000 homes and damaged
years.
160,000 more.3 Water inundated nearly every structure hugging the
seventy-mile coastline, including a local Emergency Operations
.** Counsel in the Fair Housing and Community Development Project
of the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. As described below, building on
relationships with community clients and legal advocates in the Gulf Coast, the
Lawyers' Committee has been actively involved in responding to the legal needs of
families affected by Hurricane Katrina. From October 2005 through September
2006, the Lawyers' Committee hosted over twenty-five free legal clinics for
hurricane survivors in Gulfport, Biloxi, Bay St. Louis, Waveland, Gautier, and
D'Iberville, Mississippi, as well as New Orleans. The legal clinics served over
1,500 families, primarily in Mississippi Gulf Coast communities of color, such as
North Gulfport and East Biloxi. At the legal clinics, public interest attorneys and
volunteer attorneys answered questions about issues ranging from FEMA benefits to
insurance to programs available to fund home repair. The legal clinics also led to
the creation of a FEMA Appeals program, which has placed over 350 cases with pro
bono attorneys for ongoing individual representation. To better support these clients
and others, the Lawyers' Committee has also sought policy reform from FEMA
through both advocacy and impact litigation.
We wish to thank our colleagues at the Lawyers' Committee, the Mississippi
Center for Justice, and pro bono counsel from law firms too numerous to mention.
We are honored to work with many individual families and community advocates in
the Gulf Coast and particularly extend our gratitude to Rose Johnson, Derrick
Evans, Reilly Morse, John Jopling, Karen Lash, Jeanne Backstrom, Emilie Miller,
and countless others who help rebuild communities and make our work possible.
1. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR HALEY BARBOUR, ONE YEAR AFTER KATRINA:
PROGRESS REPORT ON RECOVERY, REBUILDING AND RENEWAL 5-6 (2006)
at
available
KATRINA],
AFTER
ONE
YEAR
[hereinafter
http://www.govemorbarbour.com/ documents/oneyearafterkatrina.pdf; MARK A.
BERNSTEIN ET AL., REBUILDING HOUSING ALONG THE MISSISSIPPI COAST: IDEAS FOR
ENSURING AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING, at xi (2006), available
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasionalpapers/2006/RANDOP 162.pdf;
at
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON RECOVERY, REBUILDING, & RENEWAL, AFTER KATRINA:
BUILDING BACK BETTER THAN EVER, at ii (2005) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION REPORT]; RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT'L HURRICANE CTR.,
TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 9 (2006), available at
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf.
2. See Editorial, Mississippi'sInvisible Coast, SUN HERALD (Biloxi), Dec. 14,
2005, at A l.
3. ONE YEAR AFTER KATRINA, supra note 1, at 15.
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Center, which sits thirty feet above sea level, casting emergency
workers out into the sea.4 Families recall how the flooding reached as
high as the rafters in their homes and how buildings disintegrated
while winds ripped away roofs.5 With such staggering devastation,
much attention focused on the immediate aftermath of Katrina and the
failures of the federal emergency response, 6 burning into our national
consciousness images of elderly and poor people, mostly black,
literally abandoned by their government.7
But Katrina has truly been a continuing storm: just as many poor
communities were marginalized, segregated, and abandoned before
the storm came ashore, they remain left out of the recovery and
rebuilding effort.8
For notwithstanding President Bush's
pronouncement days after the storm in Jackson Square that "[tihe

4. Posting of Anita Lee, Don Hammack & Scott Dodd to Eyes on Katrina, Our
Main Katrina Story, http://eyesonkatrina.blogspot.com/200508-30 eyesonkatrina_
archive.html (Aug. 30, 2005, 09:30 CST).
5. DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW
ORLEANS, AND THE MississiPPi GULF COAST 148-49 (2006).
6. See H.R. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. To INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION
FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, 109TH CONG., A FAILURE OF
INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE
THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA (2006), available at

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/fullreport.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Special Edition: Hurricane
Katrina (CNN television broadcast Sept. 1, 2005), transcript available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/01/acd.01.html; Meet the Press
(NBC television broadcast Sept. 4, 2005), transcript available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9179790/.
Aaron Broussard, Jefferson Parish
President, stated:
We have been abandoned by our own country. Hurricane Katrina will go
down in history as one of the worst storms ever to hit an American coast,
but the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina will go down as one of the worst
abandonments of Americans on American soil ever in U.S. history.
Meet the Press, supra.
8. See Video: The New Homeless: The Affordable Housing Crisis on the Gulf
Coast (Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 2006),
http://www.lawyerscomm.org/2005website/home/video/thenewhomeless.html
[hereinafter The New Homeless]; Trisha Miller, After Katrina: FightingTo Survive,
SHELTERFORCE, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 19. For background on race and poverty issues
in Gulfport, Mississippi, see generally Trisha Miller, Crossing Muddy Waters,
SHELTERFORCE, July-Aug. 2005, at 9-10.
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storm didn't discriminate, and neither will the recovery effort," 9 far
too many families, and especially far too many of those most in need,
are still being left behind. Indeed, six months after Katrina, tens of
thousands of families were still waiting for Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) trailers.10 As of August 2006-one
year after the storm-only a few thousand homes in coastal
Mississippi have been rebuilt," and over 38,000 Mississippi families
are living in trailers. 12 The story did not end with the Superdome.
Rather, FEMA continued in its failure to help those with the least
resources to rebuild their lives and communities.
While there are many failures in the programmatic response to
Hurricane Katrina at the local, state, and federal levels, this article
addresses the specific ways in which FEMA's emergency disaster
9. Bush Gets Ground Tour of Katrina Damage, CNN, Sept. 12, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/12/katrina.impact/.
10. Press Release, Office of the House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi, Six
Months After Katrina: An Overview: Tens of Thousands of Katrina Survivors Are
Still Suffering and the Future of Gulf Coast Remains Unclear (Feb. 28, 2006),
available at http://democraticleader.house.gov/30something/docs/katrinasix.doc.
Underscoring the staggering level of housing need long after Katrina, FEMA
reported that, even as of March 29, 2006 (seven months after the storm), there were
"1,297 applicants who still need[ed] temporary housing in [FEMA] commercial
sites" just in Harrison County, one of Mississippi's three coastal counties.
Memorandum from Bobby Weaver, Operations Chief, Harrison County Incident
Mgmt. Team, to the Exec. Comm. Members of the Harrison County Incident Mgmt.
Team (Apr. 7, 2006) (on file with authors). Troublingly, the report also noted that
even "if these [then-] projected sites become reality, there is still not enough housing
to meet identified needs." Id.
11.
For example, as of August 25, 2006, only some 2,966 building permits
have been issued in the disaster-affected areas. Press Release, Governor's Office of
Recovery and Renewal, Mississippi Recovery Fact Sheet (Aug. 25, 2006) (on file
with author). Of those permits, virtually all were for repair or construction of singlefamily homes-only sixty were for multi-family repair and construction. Id.
12. Shaila Dewan, FEMA Halts Evictions from Trailers in Mississippi, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2006, at A16 (detailing the number of families receiving FEMA
travel trailers and mobile homes in Mississippi); see Don Hammack, Event Answers
FEMA Queries. Center Hopes To Help Evicted Residents, SUN HERALD (Biloxi),
May 10, 2006, at A7; see also GCN Recovery News Report, GULF COAST NEWS,

http://gulfcoastnews.com/Katrina/GCNLocalNewsUpdate.htm (last visited Oct.
24, 2006) ("[N]early 93,000 people are still housed in 34,552 FEMA provided
trailers in Mississippi. Since the FEMA trailers have been issued, 12,224 have been
returned .... ).
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relief and housing assistance have proved particularly, almost
deliberately, ineffective for the most vulnerable and marginalized
families-those in predominantly minority communities, those with
lower incomes and limited savings, and renters.1 3 In Part I, we
describe the scope of the storm's impact on low-income and
marginalized groups. In Part II, we summarize the myriad legal issues
low-income families encountered and how advocates at the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (Lawyers' Committee) sought
to address them. In Part III, we critique the limits of disaster response
in the wake of Katrina. Specifically, we emphasize how substantive
and procedural aspects of FEMA's disaster assistance programs failed
low-income families-unnecessarily delaying assistance to them,
utilizing unclear and ineffectual rules, or establishing barriers that
denied assistance altogether. In essence, we argue that FEMA fails to
consider the impact of policies that exclude those most in need. In
conclusion, we summarize the progress made to date in correcting
these deficiencies and identify further policy reforms needed to ensure
equitable emergency response that works for all families recovering
from the storm.

13. Neglect and exclusion of low-income renters has characterized
Mississippi's plans for its special allocation of federal recovery and rebuilding
funds. In December 2005, Congress approved a special Katrina Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) allocation for rebuilding, with $6.2 billion in
CDBG funds awarded to Louisiana and $5.05 billion to Mississippi in February.
See Allocations and Common Application and Reporting Waivers Granted to and
Alternative Requirements for CDBG Disaster Recovery Grantees Under the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 7666, 7666 (Feb. 13,
2006). Notwithstanding legal requirements mandating that the state target at least
50% of those funds for the benefit of low- and moderate-income families, very little,
if any, of the funds have reached them. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2780 (2005) (setting low- and moderate-income
targeting requirements). Indeed, more than a year after the storm, Mississippi has
proposed using less than 5% of the funds for affordable rental housing. See Press
Release, Miss. Governor Haley Barbour, Governor Barbour's Comprehensive Plan
for Gulf Coast Housing (Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://www.Govemor
barbour.corn/recovery /news/2006/sep/GHBcomprehensivehousingplan.htm. While
much can, and will, be written on this topic, a full discussion of such other relief and
recovery programs is beyond the scope of this article.
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II. THE AFTERMATH

A. Low-Income Households Suffered Severe, Even Disproportionate,
Losses in the Storm
With the popular press preoccupied with the overwhelming
14
devastation caused by the levee breach in New Orleans,
humanitarian
organizations, 15
the
Mississippi
Governor's
1
6
Commission, and the Congressional Research Service recorded the
extent of damage along Mississippi's invisible coast, noting that the
damage was borne in significant part by low-income residents. 17 The
14. Michael Newsom, Media Chased the Sexy Katrina Story, Leaving Coast
Behind, SUN HERALD (Biloxi), Aug. 26, 2006, Special Edition, at 30 ("The story of
Katrina's damage in Mississippi quickly took second place to a levee breach in New
Orleans that flooded the lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish. But because the
two happened within hours of one another, the national media mixed the two into
one story and New Orleans became the focus of the hurricane coverage."); see
Editorial, supra note 2 ("As Aug. 29 recedes into the conscious time of many
Americans, the great storm that devastated 70 miles of Mississippi's Coast,
destroying the homes and lives of hundreds of thousands, fades into a black hole of
media obscurity."). As the editor of the Sun Heraldnewspaper in Biloxi noted, "It
became impossible not to note that we had become a footnote to the larger story
....
Mark .Boyer, The Newspaper That the National Media Forgot, CJR DAILY,
Oct. 4, 2006, http://www.cjrdaily.org/behind the news/the newspaper that the_
nationa.php (noting editorials "that admonished the national media for largely
ignoring the devastation that had been visited on the residents of southern
Mississippi").
15. For example, Oxfam America established an immediate disaster response
unit in Biloxi, Mississippi, in September 2005. OXFAM AMERICA, RECOVERING
STATES? THE GULF COAST SIX MONTHS AFTER THE STORMS 4 (2006) [hereinafter
RECOVERING STATES]. Oxfam America catalogued the lack of political will and the
poor policy decisions that have contributed to this housing crisis in their
comprehensive report, OXFAM AMERICA, FORGOTTEN COMMUNITIES, UNMET
PROMISES: AN UNFOLDING TRAGEDY ON THE GULF COAST (2006), available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2006/oxfam-usa-23aug.pdf.
16. Shortly after Hurricane Katrina hit, Governor Barbour announced the
formation of the Governor's Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal to
develop a broad vision for a better Gulf Coast and South Mississippi; the
Commission produced a final report in December 2005 that summarized ideas for
rebuilding these communities and presented data on the extent of the destruction
throughout southern Mississippi. See generally GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1.

17. See

THOMAS GABE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HURRICANE KATRINA:
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2000 Census shows that in the three coastal counties of Mississippi
(Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson), approximately 51,432 households
are at or below 80% of Area Median Income (AMI), those defined as
low-income.1 8 Of these low-income households, 45.5% are renters
and 54.5% are homeowners. 19 As the Governor's Commission Report
notes, there were many lower-income households in the hurricanedevastated areas: "about 65 percent of the housing units exposed to
the surge and over 57 percent of the units exposed to flooding were
occupied by households with incomes below the U.S. median
household income level."2 ° "In Hancock and Harrison counties alone,
almost 75 percent of the housing units were occupied by households
living below the U.S. median income level.'
While Katrina indiscriminately leveled coastal communities
across the Gulf, the data suggest that, if anything, lower-income
households were disproportionately impacted.22
For example,
Line (FPL) 23
Poverty
Federal
the
of
150%
below
or
at
households
comprised some 10% of pre-Katrina households, yet such households
represented 13.5% of those within Katrina's Surge Inundation Limit
(SIL) (10,228 of 75,733).24 Calculations comparing census data with

SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPACTED AREAS 14 (2005), available

at http://www.gnocdc.org/reports/crsrept.pdf
18. Income and Housing Data for Coastal Mississippi Counties (Nat'l Low
Income Hous. Coal., 2006) (on file with authors).
19. Id.
20. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 54. "About two-thirds
of the housing units in [Harrison, Hancock, and Jackson] counties were occupied by
households with income below the U.S. median level (approximately $42,000 as of
the year 2000)." Id. at 51.
21. Id.
22. See

JOHN LOGAN, THE IMPACT OF KATRINA: RACE AND CLASS IN STORM-

DAMAGED NEIGHBORHOODS 1 (2006), http://www.s4.brown.edu/Katrina/report.pdf.

While this article focuses on Mississippi, the losses in New Orleans were even more
disproportionately felt by minorities, renters, and low-income households. Id.
23. The Federal Poverty Line, published annually, is the federal government's
official statistical measure of poverty. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Poverty Guidelines and Poverty,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/faq.shtml#definition (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
24.

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 53 tbl.2. "[I]n 2005,

the income for a family of four at 150 percent FPL [was] $29,000 per year." Id. at
52.
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FEMA flood maps similarly suggest that while low-income
households (those below 80% AMI) were about 38.18% of
households in Mississippi's three coastal counties, they constituted
43%, 41%, and 39% of households suffering storm surge damage in
Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson counties respectively.
Moreover,
the Mississippi Regional Housing Authority reported that 80% of the
subsidized housing in coastal Mississippi was damaged or completely
destroyed.26 The loss of affordable housing, coupled with the
skyrocketing post-Katrina rental market, left low-income families
without adequate housing alternatives.
In addition to these inequities, lower-income homeowners are less
likely to have the financial resources necessary to bridge the gap
between the value of their damaged or destroyed home and the cost of
rebuilding. Many low-income households are underinsured or lack
the cushion of insurance altogether, which is doubly disastrous when
insurance becomes a prerequisite for certain forms of programmatic
assistance.27
Income has a significant bearing on whether
homeowners purchase insurance, and research reveals that
25. See Income and Housing Data for Coastal Mississippi Counties, supra note
18. Overall statistics on the number of units impacted may actually understate the
effect of Katrina on low-income households. Low-income families are more likely
to reside in older and substandard housing, which sustained greater wind and water
damage from the hurricane. See, e.g., RECOVERING STATES, supra note 15, at 11
("Studies also show that low-income and minority housing units are often older and
more subject to damage than other housing .... ").
26. Michael Kunzelman, Unhabitable Habitats: Tenants Living in Squalor,
SUN HERALD (Biloxi), Apr. 16, 2006, at A19 ("Before Katrina, the coastal office of
the Mississippi Regional Housing Authority had 1,592 units of affordable housing.
The hurricane damaged roughly 80 percent of those units, displacing 800
families .... 5).
27. For example, Mississippi's initial plans for its special allocation of federal
rebuilding funds, see supra note 13, created a grant program to assist homeowners
outside of flood plains who lacked flood insurance-but homeowners were only
eligible if they maintained homeowners' insurance. See MISS. DEV. AUTH., PARTIAL
ACTION PLAN FOR KATRINA RECOVERY HOMEOWNER GRANT PROGRAM 4-6 (2006),
http://www.mississippi.org/UserFiles/File/HomeOwnersAssistance_Program/hap
3606%20final.pdf; see also Memorandum from Will Fischer & Barbara Sard, Ctr.
on Budget & Policy Priorities, Key State Decisions Regarding Use of CDBG and
LIHTC Funds in Mississippi (Jan. 9, 2006) (on file with authors) ("[The Governor's
plan] limits assistance to the lower of $150,000 or the property's insured value, and
requires homeowners to rebuild to higher building standards than were in place
before the storm and maintain flood insurance in the future.").
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"percentages of homeowners with insurance dropped as household
incomes decreased., 28 As an Oxfam America report notes, "[M]ore
affluent people are more likely to purchase flood insurance from the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and purchase greater
amounts of insurance than poorer people." 29 It is axiomatic that,
given their financial constraints, many elderly, fixed-income, and lowincome households simply do not purchase or maintain insurance.
Without adequate insurance coverage, low-income homeowners living
in the seventy-mile flood zone simply could not afford to rebuild.
B. Renters, ParticularlyLow-Income Renters,
Face Additional Barriers
Katrina erased a surplus in market-rate rental units and created a
nightmare for tenants facing skyrocketing rents and a wave of illegal,
pretextual evictions. The Mississippi Center for Justice, along with
the Mississippi Center for Legal Services, conducted a field inspection
of large apartment complexes in Harrison, Jackson, and Hancock
counties. 30 The study revealed that over fifty percent of subsidized
rental housing on the Gulf Coast was uninhabitable. 3 1 Renters are
increasingly vulnerable to poor housing conditions because of the
rental housing crisis and the fact that they have been excluded from
various forms of governmental rebuilding assistance--especially the
28.

RECOVERING STATES,

supra note 15, at 16.

29. Id. at 15.
30. Richard Fausset, 30 Days' Notice at the FEMA Trailer: Eviction Letters Go
Out to About 3,000 Katrina Victims, Who Are Told They're Ineligible, L.A. TIMES,
May 20, 2006, at Al ("More than half the coast's subsidized housing stock was
uninhabitable as of mid-April, according to a survey by the Mississippi Center for
Justice, a public interest law firm."); Dita McCarthy, Miss. Ctr. for Legal Servs.,
John Jopling & Reilly Morse, Miss. Ctr. for Justice, Preliminary Results of Survey
of Subsidized Housing on Mississippi Coast (Apr. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Survey of
Subsidized Housing] (on file with authors) (described in Priscilla Frulla, Apartment
Losses Near 50%: 10,000 Units Fell Victim to Katrina, SUN HERALD (Biloxi), Oct.
31, 2006, at B8); see also ONE YEAR AFTER KATRINA, supra note 1, at 20 ("The
Gulfport-based Mississippi Regional Housing Authority No. VIII and public
housing authorities in Bay St. Louis, Biloxi, Waveland and Long Beach sustained
damage to more than 90 percent of their nearly 2,700 public housing units, with
approximately 10 percent of their units being totally destroyed.").
31. Survey of Subsidized Housing, supra note 30; see also Frulla, supra note

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006

9

California Western Law Review, Vol. 43 [2006], No. 1, Art. 4

30

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Homeowner Grant Assistance Program developed by the state for its
federal rebuilding allocation.32
While renters can receive
compensation under FEMA's disaster assistance program for personal
property loss and temporary housing assistance (the Individual and
Households Program described infra in Part IV.A.), only homeowners
can receive compensation for home repair.33 As a result, low-income
renters subsist in substandard apartment buildings and find themselves
increasingly exposed to threats of eviction.
The loss of such a huge share of rental housing, and serious
damage to more, put low-income tenants on the verge of homelessness
long after the storm. Unfortunately, substandard and uninhabitable
conditions,
illegal evictions,
and spiking
rents became
commonplace.34
Throughout coastal Mississippi, unscrupulous
landlords sought to empty developments full of low-income tenants to
take advantage of increasing rents in a market with little remaining
35
affordable rental housing.
32.

See supra note 13 (describing Mississippi's plans for federal reconstruction

funds to date). Mississippi's plan for its federal reconstruction allocation creates
concern that many Mississippians will be left behind, particularly persons with
disabilities, low-income homeowners, and renters. Memorandum from Will Fischer
& Barbara Sard, supra note 27, at 2-3. For program details, see MISS. DEV. AUTH.,
supra note 27.
33. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.117(b)(2) (2005); FEMA, HELP AFTER A DISASTER:
APPLICANT'S GUIDE TO THE INDIVIDUALS & HOUSEHOLDS PROGRAM 1-2 (2005)
[hereinafter FEMA, HELP AFTER A DISASTER], available at http://www.fema.gov/
pdf/assistance/process/helpafter disaster english.pdf
(describing
assistance
programs for households).
34. See infra note 61 (discussing rent increases). The Lawyers' Committee
hosted over twenty-five free legal clinics for hurricane survivors in the disasterdevastated Gulf Coast from October 2005 through September 2006. Many of the
interviews with hurricane survivors, regarding poor housing conditions, evictions,
and increased rents can be viewed in the documentary film, The New Homeless,
supra note 8. In addition, the Lawyers' Committee and the Mississippi Center for
Justice intervened to prevent two illegal threats of eviction at Edgewood Manor
Apartments and Waters Mark Apartments in Gulfport, Mississippi. Letter from
John Jopling, Miss. Ctr. for Justice, & Joseph D. Rich, Lawyers' Comm. for Civil
Rights Under Law, to Rodger Ales, Jr., Resident Manager, Edgewood Manor Apts.
(Oct. 28, 2005) (on file with authors); Letter from John Jopling, Miss. Ctr. for
Justice, & Jonathan P. Hooks, Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, to
Sandalwood Mgmt., Inc. (Dec. 21, 2005) (on file with authors).
35. See Trisha Miller, The Second Storm: Mass Evictions Threaten Gulf Coast
Tenants, SHELTERFORCE, Summer 2006, at 33, available at http://www.
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A jarring example of this scenario occurred at Edgewood Manor,
a federally-subsidized apartment complex in Gulfport. Following
Katrina, over fifty families at Edgewood Manor were simply deserted
by their property manager.3 6 The management company reported that
the building had been "totally destroyed" by the storm.3 7 Meanwhile,
residents were left behind without roofs, running water, trash pickup,
and in some cases, basic plumbing. 38 Christine Brice, a North
Gulfport resident, witnessed families in Edgewood Manor starting a
fire in a bucket in order to keep warm, while others relied on gas
stoves to heat their apartments. 39 On top of these deplorable housing
conditions, tenants dreaded a mass eviction. In October 2005, just a
month after the storm, security guards told residents that the apartment
40
gates would be welded shut, blocking any reentry into the complex.
On the residents' behalf, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and
the Mississippi Center for Justice forced the landlord to cease eviction
threats and allow tenants to remain at Edgewood Manor.41

nhi.org/online/issues/146/secondstorm.html; Ana Radelat, Many Coast Renters Face
New Eviction: Low-Income Katrina Victims Unable To Afford Higher Payments,
CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Dec. 3, 2005, at 1A ("Community activists and
legal aid groups say they're battling a wave of evictions of low-income Katrina
victims. They say landlords are eager to replace those tenants with people who are
willing, and able, to pay much higher rents because housing is scarce in the Katrinawrecked region."). See also The New Homeless, supra note 8. For a discussion of
increased rents, see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
36. Miller, supra note 35, at 33; Letter from John Jopling & Joseph D. Rich to
Rodger Ates, Jr., supra note 34.
37. Facsimile from Bill Mays, Southland Mgmt. Co., to U.S. Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev. (Sept. 1, 2005) (on file with authors).
38. Tom Wilemon, No Place Else To Go: Edgewood Manor Tenants Tangled
in Red Tape, SuN HERALD (Biloxi), Jan. 28, 2006, at Al ("Five months after
Hurricane Katrina, damage to [Edgewood Manor] has not been repaired. People
live in apartments with partial roofs. One person subsists without running water due
to damaged plumbing."); Radelat, supra note 35 ("While some tenants were forced
to leave because their apartments were so heavily damaged, those who stayed felt
that was their best option.").
39. Interviews with residents, at Lawyers' Committee Disaster Relief Legal
Clinic, Gulfport, Miss. (Oct. 27, 2005); The New Homeless, supra note 8.
40. Interviews with residents, supra note 39.
41. Letter from John Jopling & Joseph D. Rich to Rodger Ates, Jr., supra note
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Even private housing that survived the storm in reasonably good
condition provided no panacea, as many landlords preferred to remove
old tenants (at pre-Katrina rents) and bring in new tenants at higher
prices. At Gulfport's Waters Mark apartment complex, tenants-even
those with habitable premises and leases running well into 2006received eviction notices in November 2005 telling them to move out
on December 31, 2005.42 Though the notices claimed the evictions
were necessary due to pervasive storm damage at the complex that
needed repair, the landlord was simultaneously advertising vacant
apartments for rent in January 2006-presumably at a new and higher
price.43 As lawyers for the tenants, the Lawyers' Committee and
Mississippi Center for Justice were able to correct this injustice, if
only for the term of tenants' leases.
Individual tenants also face ongoing threats of eviction. 4 For
example, Biloxi resident Howard Reynolds, who had been living out
of his car after the storm, finally located an apartment for rent in
November 2005. 45 While the apartment lacked sheetrock and a
permanent ceiling, Mr. Reynolds agreed to pay full rent while the
landlord remodeled the apartment.46 After several months, no repairs
47
had been made, and the landlord began demanding additional rent.
When Mr. Reynolds refused to pay, the landlord began the common
practice known as a "self-help" eviction, 48 removing the locks and
42. See Letter from John Jopling and Jonathan P. Hooks to Sandalwood
Mgmt., Inc., supra note 34.
43. See Mike Keller, Renters Contest Eviction: Waters Mark Says It Wants To
Make Repairs, SUN HERALD (Biloxi), Dec. 24, 2005, at B8.
44. See, e.g., Radelat, supra note 35 ("[Greg Dedeaux] spent two weeks living
in his car before returning to his unit at the Tonya Apartments with his mother, also

displaced by the storm, once repairs were made to the roof of the complex. But like
many low-income tenants on the Gulf Coast and in New Orleans, Dedeaux now
faces eviction for nonpayment of rent.").
45. All individual clients have been given pseudonyms for the purpose of this
article. Mr. Reynolds was interviewed by a pro bono attorney at a Lawyers'
Committee disaster relief legal clinic in Biloxi, Mississippi on April 10, 2006, and
his case was referred to the Mississippi Center for Justice for representation.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. "Self-help eviction" refers to the practice whereby a landlord evicts a
tenant outside the legal system, without the use or oversight of officers designated
by the court system to ensure orderly, non-violent evictions. See Bender v. N.
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shutting off all utilities.4 9 Overnight, Mr. Reynolds joined the ranks
of thousands of low-income renters with no place to go.
Ultimately, the rash of evictions on the pretext of storm damage
became so severe that the Gulfport City Attorney took the
extraordinary step of issuing a letter warning landlords that such
evictions were illegal, absent a government determination that the unit
was unsafe.5 °
Unfortunately, coastal Mississippi had a high percentage of
renters, particularly in areas damaged by Katrina: "The Mississippi
Gulf Coast has a higher percentage of renters than the rest of the state
... . In low-income communities on the coast, fully half of the
residents were renters.,, 5 1 Low-income persons in the disaster area are
also more likely to be renters. 52
In communities like Biloxi,
catastrophic damage besieged these individuals, and meeting their
needs is all the more imperative to reviving the community.53 A year
Meridian Mobile Home Park, 636 So. 2d 385, 388-89 (Miss. 1994) (describing selfhelp eviction method and allowing such evictions if permitted under lease
agreement). In practice, the landlord engaging in self-help eviction simply changes
the locks on the rental unit and disposes of the tenant's personal property. Id.
49. Conversation withpro bono attorney at Lawyers' Committee legal clinic in
Biloxi, Mississippi (Apr. 10, 2006).
50. See Letter from Harry P. Hewes, Gulfport City Attorney, to All Owners
and Rental Agents of Residential Property in the City of Gulfport (Sept. 2005) (on
file with authors) (stating that "[u]nless a residential unit is determined by proper
authorities to be unsafe for occupancy, it is unlawful to dispossess a tenant in
rightful possession of his/her rental home").
51. RECOVERING STATES, supra note 15, at 13. The Governor's Commission
Report notes low rates of homeownership in these areas. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 50. While renters were 28% of all pre-Katrina households
in Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson Counties, they were 30% of households within
Katrina's Surge Inundation Limit (SIL). See id. at 53 tbl.2. Conversely, while
homeowners were 62% of all pre-Katrina households, they were 57% of those
within the SIL (43,226 of 75,733). Id.
52. In the disaster areas, there is a much lower rate of homeownership for those
below the poverty line (27%) than for those above it(62%). See GABE ET AL., supra
note 17, at 24. According to the National Low Income Housing Coalition, more
than half the housing destroyed by Katrina was rentals, and about 70% was
affordable to lower-income renters those making 80% or less of the Area Median
Income. See Sue Kirchhoff, Rebuilding After Katrina To Take Monumental Effort,
USA TODAY, Oct. 6, 2005, at 1B.
53. For example, the Governor's Commission Report describes the peninsular
tip of Biloxi (East Biloxi), noting that in a sample of 6,404 housing units, nearly all
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after Katrina, the population who weathered the storm without the
financial and emotional asset of homeownership remains saddled with
a prolonged recovery period and inadequate housing alternatives.
C. Minority Communities Can Be ParticularlyVulnerable
Lower-income and higher poverty populations within the disaster
area are disproportionately communities of color. For example, nearly
one in three African-American Katrina survivors is at or below the
poverty level, leaving thousands of minority families without financial
resources to rebuild.54 Significantly, poverty and homeownership
rates among racial minorities are pronounced: of the many renters in
the coastal counties, a disproportionate number were African
Americans. 55 Throughout the Mississippi Gulf Coast, the AfricanAmerican poverty rate is 27.1% compared to 10.4% for whites.5 6 The
homeownership rate is 49.8% for African Americans compared to
74.0% for whites, with some communities having an even greater

households fell below the U.S. median income level. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 54. Extensive or catastrophic damage was reported in over
80% of these homes. Id. Less than 40% of housing units in this area were owneroccupied, and the vast majority of the rental units were extensively or
catastrophically damaged. Id. In short, whole communities like East Biloxi can be
left behind in the rebuilding if resources do not effectively reach low-income
families.
54. RECOVERING STATES, supranote 15, at 8 tbl.1 (citing U.S. Census Bureau
Census 2000 data).
African-American households in Mississippi are disproportionately
impoverished. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, African-American
populations have higher poverty rates and lower homeownership rates
than white populations in the hurricane-affected areas ....
This holds
true on the Gulf Coast generally, in rural areas (Jones County), and in five
of the hardest hit urban areas-Biloxi, Gulfport, Moss Point, Pascagoula,
and Pass Christian. In Pascagoula, where the disparity is particularly
stark, the poverty rate for African-American households at 42 percent is
almost four times that of white households at 11 percent.
Id. at 7 (citing U.S. Census Bureau Census 2000 data).
55. Id. at 13. "In low-income communities on the coast, fully half of the
residents were renters. African-Americans in those [Gulf Coast] communities are
even more likely to be renters, particularly in Gulfport and Moss Point/Pascagoula
where the prevalence of renters is 63 percent and 67 percent respectively." Id.
56. Id. at 8 tbl.1 (citing U.S. Census Bureau Census 2000 data).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol43/iss1/4

14

Hooks and Miller: The Continuing Storm: How Disaster Recovery Excludes Those Most i

2006]

THE CONTINUING STORM

disparity. 7 In addition, according to Oxfam America, "[S]tudies
indicate that there are marked ethnic and racial inequalities in
adequate insurance coverage." 58 Other marginalized groups, such as
Vietnamese immigrants 59 and disabled persons, 60 also face especially
high hurdles in the recovery process.
The Mississippi Gulf Coast is only a portion of the disasterdevastated area. But the tenuous position of lower-income and
minority populations, particularly renters, is endemic. As the supply
of rental housing dwindled due to storm damage, rental prices in
coastal Mississippi skyrocketed over the pre-Katrina rates. 61 Inflated
57. Id.
58. Id. at 11. Further, studies show that these inequities are reinforced by
discrimination within the insurance industry. Testers found, for example, that
insurance agents who identified a non-white voice on the phone were more likely to
ask the location of the home earlier in the conversation. Gregory D. Squires,
Linguistic Profiling: A Continuing Tradition of Discrimination in the Home
InsuranceIndustry?, 41 URB. AFF. REV. 400, 403 (2006).
59. "About 2,000 Vietnamese Americans live in East Biloxi alone, making up
almost 20% of the area's 8,500 residents." UYEN LE, NAT'L ALLIANCE OF
VIETNAMESE AM. SERV. AGENCIES, THE INVISIBLE TIDE: VIETNAMESE AMERICANS
IN BILOXI, MS: AN UPDATE ONE YEAR AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA 3 (2006),
available at http://www.navasa.org/pdf/BiloxiReport.pdf.
"A recent (2006)
mapping of the Vietnamese-owned properties in East Biloxi showed that 70% of the
Vietnamese community lived inside the 100-year flood zone" (i.e., an area
disproportionately hit by Katrina storm surge). Id. at 12. In addition, immigrant
groups face obvious language and cultural barriers to accessing benefits.
60. Compared with the non-disabled, persons with disabilities are
disproportionately poor. U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, People:
Disability,
http://factfinder.census.gov/jsp/saff/SAFFInfo.jsp?_pageld=tp4_
disability (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) ("In 2000, 8.7 million people with disabilities
were poor-a substantially higher proportion (17.6 percent) than was found among
people without disabilities (10.6 percent)."); U.S. Census Bureau, Disability Status,
Employment, and Annual Earnings: Individuals 21 to 64 Years Old: 2002, available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/sipp/disabO2/dsO2t5.pdf (illustrating
that people with disabilities have mean annual earnings of $23,034, and nondisabled persons earn $32,870 per year). In addition, many of the communities
impacted by Katrina have high rates of people with disabilities (23.2% in New
Orleans, Louisiana; 23.4% in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana; 21% in Jefferson
Parish, Louisiana; 27.1% in Hancock County, Mississippi; and 21.3% in Jackson
County, Mississippi). Press Release, Nat'l Council on Indep. Living, NCIL Action
Alert: NCIL Principles on Housing Policy in Light of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
(Oct. 13, 2005), availableat http://www.ncil.org/news/katrinahousing.html.
61. "Rents have soared about 25% to 30%, according to the Biloxi Ocean
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market rents-and the loss of public and subsidized housingeffectively eliminated much of the affordable rental housing on the
Gulf Coast.62 These factors, exacerbated by the sluggish pace of new
construction, leave many vulnerable families in a precarious position
when FEMA's disaster assistance is delayed or denied.
III. LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE DISASTER

The sheer loss of affordable housing and the alarming number of
post-disaster evictions threaten to create an entire new homeless
population in Mississippi, one of the poorest states in the nation.63 In
addition to causing emotional and physical devastation, the storm left
behind myriad legal hurdles for Katrina survivors. Meanwhile, the
local legal services infrastructure was paralyzed in the aftermath.64
Even before the storm, few local attorneys provided services to the
lowest-income families. 65 After the storm, many remaining attorneys,
Springs Assn. of Realtors." Fausset, supra note 30. See also RECOVERING STATES,
supra note 15, at 14 ("Housing shortages after a disaster have a tendency to inflate
rents, which adds to the burden of already vulnerable victims' ability to recover at a
time when affordable housing is most needed. Renters will have few resources with
which to rebuild their lives, and few housing options in their communities without
assistance and resources dedicated to bringing back affordable rental units."). The
local housing authority reports that even displaced families with Section 8 vouchers
paying up to Fair Market Rent for the coastal areas are finding it nearly impossible
to locate rental units at the former rent levels. Telephone Interview by Jesse
Lawson-McCreedy with Mark Creech, Ass't Dir., Miss. Reg'l Hous. Auth. for
Region VIII (Oct. 25, 2006). Creech informed legal services advocates that out of
1,374 Section 8 voucher-holders displaced by Katrina, virtually none had been able
to reuse their housing subsidies in the Gulf Coast. Id. Instead, some 900 or more
are in FEMA trailers, and 300 or more are spread out over 42 states using HUD
Disaster Vouchers in lieu of Section 8 vouchers. Id.
62. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 43; Kunzelman, supra note 26.
63. Mississippi has the lowest median household income in the country. See
U.S. Census Bureau, Income 2005-Three-Year-Average Median Household
Income by State: 2003-2005, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/income05/
statemhi3.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
64. For the comments of Sam Buchanan, Director of Mississippi Legal
Services, see Video: MCJ on the Post-Katrina Coast (Miss. Ctr. for Justice 2006),
http://www.mscenterfoijustice.org/gallery/gallery.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
65. See Video: Rebuilding Lives: Lawyers' Committee Provides Hurricane
Relief in Coastal Mississippi (Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
2006), http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/2005website/home/video/quicktime.html.
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hurricane survivors themselves, had lost their offices and were unable
to provide these services alone. 66 While the most pressing needs after
the storm-food, shelter, medical care-were outside the expertise of
attorneys, without legal representation, the marginalized communities
on the Gulf Coast could all too easily be deprived, once again, of the
benefits enjoyed by higher-income families.
Weeks after the disaster, Lawyers' Committee attorneys and other
volunteers headed to Gulfport, Mississippi, with legal guides and
emergency supplies to serve in the first wave of legal responders.
What we found was a chaotic process with rules ill-designed to meet
the real needs of low-income families. Because FEMA was slow to
open Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs), 67 families were forced to
register for FEMA benefits by phone or internet.68 Yet, the hundreds
of families we saw at the emergency shelter area in North Gulfport
had no access to working phone lines or internet connections. The
few that found a donated cell phone would have to remain on hold
throughout the night, awaiting a FEMA phone representative.
As a result, FEMA assistance was the hardest to access by the
group that needed it most: poor families without savings of their own
to turn to as they awaited emergency aid. Those who could not afford
to evacuate remained in isolation for several weeks following the
storm. Often, they remained unregistered with the agency since the
phone lines to which families were directed remained constantly
jammed and inaccessible. Ongoing individual representation was
desperately needed.
In response, the Lawyers' Committee developed a series of legal
clinics designed to educate predominantly low-income and minority
communities about their rights and assist them in the FEMA benefits
process.69 Our legal clinics in North Gulfport, East Biloxi, and
"Before the storm, there were only two legal services attorneys for every 10,000
Mississippians who qualified for legal services." Id. (quoting John Jopling of the
Mississippi Center for Justice).
66. See, e.g., John Ryan, Washed Away, LAWDRAGON, Winter 2006, at 28;
MCJ on the Post-Katrina Coast, supra note 64.
67. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
68. See FEMA: Disaster Assistance Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.fema.gov/assistance/dafaq.shtm#l (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
69. See, e.g., Hammack, supra note 12 (stating that a legal clinic will provide
"an assembly-line style setup to help process people with questions about 30-day
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elsewhere reached over 1500 families in core disaster areas, providing
assistance with registering for FEMA benefits and resolving insurance
and mortgage problems and landlord-tenant disputes. Volunteer
lawyers worked one-on-one with disaster survivors to address these
issues, as well as employment, small business, and home repair issues.
The obstacles to accessing FEMA's Individuals and Households
Program, which assists families displaced by disasters, proved
difficult to navigate-often even for the advocates themselves,
confronted with unclear explanations from FEMA and inconsistent
application of ill-defined and unpublished rules. As became apparent,
many families needed ongoing individualized representation to
overcome the FEMA barriers described in this article. Stemming
from the legal clinics, the Lawyers' Committee and law firms working
pro bono created a FEMA Appeals project that provided continuing
representation to over 350 families, many of whose stories are
included here.
To address FEMA's unresponsiveness to the needs of displaced
families on a larger scale, the Lawyers' Committee, in conjunction
with other lawyers, brought a class action on November 10, 2005, on
behalf of all displaced persons who had applied or were applying for
FEMA assistance. 70 Among other things, the suit alleged that
FEMA's response to Katrina violated the Stafford Act, which governs
FEMA's disaster response, and FEMA's constitutional due process
obligations.7 ' Specifically, the suit challenged procedural burdens
(described below) that delayed or denied benefits to families, such as
FEMA's application of the "shared household rule," which rendered
many applicants ineligible if they shared an address with other
applicants before the storm, but established separate households after
the disaster, 72 and FEMA's requirement of a Small Business
Administration loan application prior to receipt of FEMA housing
assistance.73 In addition, the suit addressed FEMA's denial or
suspension of benefits under circumstances created by its own failure

termination notices and other FEMA issues").
70. McWaters v. FEMA (McWaters 1), 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 225-27 (E.D. La.
2006).
71. Id. at 226.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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to inform applicants of their rights and obligations and the effective
denial of benefits to numerous households due to FEMA's excessive
delays, including 80,000
applications still listed as "pending" three
74
months after the storm.
The first successful ruling on McWaters came on December 12,
2005, when the court enjoined FEMA's arbitrarily threatened
termination of all households residing in hotels through FEMA's
emergency housing program.75 The injunction ensured a more orderly
process. Just before Thanksgiving 2005, FEMA proposed to displace
all such families on a handful of days' notice, even though many
families had yet to receive a determination from FEMA as to whether
they were entitled to continued housing assistance in the form of rent
or a trailer.76 In other words, FEMA proposed to displace families
before they could demonstrate they were entitled to continuing shelter.
In entering a preliminary injunction against FEMA's actions, the court
described FEMA's insensitivity towards the needs of low-income
households, bemoaning its sudden changes in policy combined with a
lack of clarity for those it was charged to assist.7 7 Finding that "these

74. Id.
at 226-27.
75. Id.
at 236-37.
76. Id.
at 225, 233-36.
77. Id. at 233-34. Displaced families were threatened with eviction initially on
November 30, 2005, then December 15, 2005, then January 7, 2006, and remained
ill-informed as to how they could obtain eligibility for continuing housing assistance
from FEMA. As the Court recounted:
FEMA's actions in reference to its subsidy of hotels and motels have been
notoriously erratic and numbingly insensitive .... [T]hese victims have
been told by FEMA that they would have to leave their respective hotels
or motels on November 30, 2005, then December 15, 2005. They were
then told that some would have to leave on December 15, 2005 whereas
others would have until January 7, 2005 [sic]. As of December 9, 2005,
the date of the instant hearing, FEMA provided a letter which in essence
stated that in the event an applicant had not received his or her funds by
December 15, 2005 the applicant could remain at their hotel or motel. It is
unimaginable what anxiety and misery these erratic and bizarre
vacillations by FEMA have caused these victims, all of whom, for at least
one point in time, had the very real fear of being without shelter for
Christmas. When Michael Hirsch, Individual Assistance Branch Chief of
FEMA's Recovery Division, was asked as to the rationale for this
termination of benefits, he seemed as bewildered as this Court and
basically stated he did not know.
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actions by FEMA . . . discriminate against victims based on the
grounds of economic status and prohibited in the Stafford Act,"78 the
court enjoined the evictions and mandated a more open and fair
process. 79 Specifically, prior to displacing any family, FEMA had to
determine the family's eligibility for continuing housing benefits and
provide at least two weeks notice. 80 As a result of the order, tens of
thousands of evacuees remained in hotels and motels during the
8
holidays and some until the following spring. '
The court also preliminarily enjoined FEMA from imposing the
onerous and unnecessary requirement that applicants for temporary
housing assistance complete a Small Business Administration (SBA)
loan application, one of the primary barriers delaying needed
benefits. 82 The full impact of this barrier, particularly for low-income
households, is described infra at Part IV.B.2.b.
Overall, the
McWaters case complemented individual representation efforts by
attacking systematic barriers. Even on claims where the case did not
succeed legally, such as the challenges to the "shared household rule,"
it continued to put in sharp relief the policy areas where FEMA's
programs fell short of helping those most in need.83 Indeed, as noted
Id. (citation omitted). Unfortunately, FEMA's contradictory and confusing, even
terrifying, pattern of informing applicants about denial or termination of their
benefits was repeated later. FEMA's decision to terminate trailer assistance to
thousands of families with limited review of whether they were, in fact, eligible to
continue to reside there is one prominent example. See Dewan, supra note 12 ("For
several months, FEMA has repeatedly changed deadlines, sent conflicting letters to
applicants, and declared people ineligible for housing assistance for the lack of
signatures or failures to appear in person for property inspections."); infra notes
120-25 and accompanying text.
78. McWaters 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 235. "[T]he majority of the persons
affected by the [hotel eviction] deadline are the most disadvantaged of our citizens
and/or the persons who lost virtually all of their property, economic livelihood, and
in some cases, family members." Id. at 234.
79. Id. at 236-37.
80. Id. at 236.
81. See id.; McWaters 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 239-40 (E.D. La. 2006)
(modifying order).
82. McWaters 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 236-37. The court subsequently made the
injunction permanent. McWaters v. FEMA (McWaters I), 436 F. Supp. 2d 802,
822-23 (E.D. La. 2006).
83. Following the success of McWaters, other suits challenged FEMA's
administration of disaster relief in other key respects, with mixed results. See, e.g.,
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below, the court bemoaned the same administrative chaos and
impenetrable policies that bedeviled many low-income applicants
trying to navigate the benefits process, even calling for legislative
solutions to correct these failures.
IV. LEFT BEHIND: FEMA PROGRAMS AND LOW-INCOME FAMILIES
A. FEMA 's DisasterAssistance. How Program
Design Creates Barriers
To better understand how FEMA's Individuals and Households
Program (IHP), which provides benefits to displaced families, can
exclude or limit benefits available to those most in need, we first
explain the types of FEMA benefits available after a disaster.8 4 In
describing the programs, we note how, substantively, they are
designed for higher-income households who have assets to fall back
on after the disaster. Indeed, many programs presume that families
will be able to draw on resources to complement FEMA's assistance,
which consequently means that poor families-or families above the
poverty line, but with no savings-may be unable to effectively utilize
FEMA programs or may receive fewer benefits than similarly situated
but higher-income households.85 The following section addresses the
proceduralbarriers faced by families in accessing benefits.
Settlement Agreement, Brou v. FEMA, Case No. 06-0838 (E.D. La. entered into on
Aug. 15, 2006) (settlement agreement resolving FEMA's failure to provide trailers
accessible to disabled individuals), http://femaanswers.org/images/a/a6/Brou-v
fema_settlementagmt.pdf; Watson v. FEMA, 437 F. Supp. 2d 638, 651 (S.D. Tex.
2006) (granting a preliminary injunction that requires FEMA to permit applicants to
use Temporary Housing Assistance funds to pay utility costs), vacated, No. 0620651 (5th Cir. Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://femaanswers.org/images/c/cb/5th_
Cir decision Watson.pdf.
84. For FEMA's description of its assistance programs for households, see
FEMA, HELP AFTER A DISASTER, supra note 33.

85. As one report notes, lower-income "households are much less likely than
their higher income counterparts to have the resources needed to avoid hardship and,
in some cases, homelessness when the erratic federal evacuee housing assistance
system fails them." WILL FISCHER & BARBARA SARD, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, HOUSING NEEDS OF MANY LOW-INCOME HURRICANE EVACUEES ARE
NOT BEING ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED 1 (2006), http://www.cbpp.org/2-23-06 hous.
pdf. The report further observes:
They also are less likely to have the necessary resources to cover gaps
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1. Emergency Assistance and Shelter
FEMA provides immediate emergency shelter assistance to
displaced people through a variety of state intermediaries such as the
Red Cross and state emergency management agencies.8 6
These
programs, sometimes referred to as "Section 403" sheltering

programs, provided a wide variety of housing types after Katrina,
ranging from shelters to programs that housed displaced people in
hotels or apartments which were rented on their behalf.87 Importantly,
families in these housing programs could initially enter such housing
without needing to individually establish their eligibility for FEMA
benefits. 88
Because such direct assistance did not require

individualized determinations of eligibility for assistance, it initially
created few problems. Nonetheless, problems arose in transitioning
families from emergency assistance to FEMA's ongoing disaster
assistance (which did require individual eligibility determinations),
because sudden policy changes confused and threatened families,
89
requiring judicial intervention in the Mc Waters suit.
between what federal homeowner assistance is providing and the cost of
rebuilding or replacing a home, or to be able to cope with the sharp
increases in rental costs that have occurred in a number of the areas
damaged by the hurricanes as a result of the large decline in the supply of
habitable rental housing in these areas.
Id.
86. See McWaters 1, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 225; see also Press Release, FEMA,
Temporary Housing for Hurricane Katrina Evacuees Includes Cruise Ships (Sept. 4,
2005), available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease. fema?id= 18606
(describing FEMA temporary housing programs).
87. See McWaters I, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 225.
88. See FEMA, Hurricane Katrina Fact Sheet: Frequently Asked Questions
Section 403 Sheltering, Sept. 29, 2005, at 2, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/
govemment/grant/pa/faq_403 shelteringl.pdf. ("Do evacuees have to register for
FEMA assistance as a condition of receiving interim housing assistance?").
Agencies operating 403 sheltering need only submit from applicants "name of head
of household; number of household members; FEMA registration number (if
available); address of damaged home; address of interim housing; name and mailing
address of lessor; number of months evacuee resided in interim housing; term of
lease in months; monthly rent; furniture costs; penalties (if claimed)." Id.
89. See McWaters I, 408 F. Supp.2d at 234-36. Though a full examination of
these FEMA decisions is beyond the scope of this essay, shortly after the disaster,
the process of evaluating the eligibility of displaced families in emergency
sheltering programs created significant problems, particularly the threat of mass
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2. FEMA 's Individuals and Households Program
FEMA's Individuals and Households
components, described below.

Program has

several

a. Temporary Housing Assistance
Beyond the immediate post-disaster period, FEMA provides
temporary housing assistance for up to eighteen months after a
disaster, though the deadline can be extended by FEMA.9 ° Housing
assistance can be indirect, through rental assistance, or direct, through
provision of a physical unit such as a trailer or mobile home.
In this disaster, FEMA's rental assistance programmatically
provided rent assistance of $786 per month (in the form of a single
displacement from emergency housing. As discussed above, in late November
2005, FEMA announced it would terminate hotel assistance for thousands of
families residing in hotels in New Orleans and other cities if they did not
demonstrate eligibility for continuing housing assistance. Id. at 225. Unfortunately,.
the terminations were scheduled on a relatively short timeframe-a matter of less
than two weeks-and the process was unclear and confusing to many displaced
families. Id. at 225, 233-34. Indeed, as with other FEMA policy decisions, the
intent appeared to be to confuse FEMA applicants and discourage them from
seeking available benefits. These threatened evictions were addressed in the
McWaters litigation, in which FEMA was ordered to extend the time to qualify for
assistance prior to termination/eviction. See id. at 236; see also Mc Waters II, 436 F.
Supp. 2d 802, 820-21 (E.D. La. 2006) ("[W]hile FEMA may not be legally required
to notify applicants or recipients of assistance about what FEMA provides, much
less provide any data regarding its availability or the requirements for obtaining
such assistance, one can only wonder why FEMA would choose to not do so, as has
so often been the case herein.... [T]he Court has seen scant evidence that any such
desire for openness and clarity guided any of FEMA's communications, and this
obfuscation has acted much to the detriment of [FEMA applicants], and indeed, the
entire country."). Similar problems have confronted terminations from other
emergency sheltering programs (such as city-sponsored apartment programs in
Texas), and evictions from FEMA trailers. See Complaint at 2, Watson v. FEMA,
Case No. H-06-1709 (S.D. Tex., May 19, 2006) (noting 7,602 households in
Houston at risk of displacement as "ineligible"; 2,121 households in the Dallas-Ft.
Worth area), available at http://www.femaanswers.org/images/d/da/Watsonv_
FEMA -_1st Amend Complaint.pdf; infra at notes 120-25 and accompanying text
(discussing trailer evictions).
90. 44 C.F.R. § 206.110(e) (2005) (stating FEMA may extend the eighteen
month period if its Associate Director "determines that due to extraordinary
circumstances an extension would be in the public interest.").
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check of $2358 for three months); 9 ' thereafter, the rent subsidy would
provide support up to the HUD-established Fair Market Rent for the
area. 92 However, the program had several limitations that hampered
its effectiveness for many of our clients. Households, especially those
with low incomes, experienced difficulty effectively using the
assistance to secure long-term housing for several reasons:
" Inadequate Rents: In the disaster areas of coastal Mississippi
and New Orleans, the rent assistance was of limited utility since
there were few rental units available after the storm-and those
that remained had dramatically increased rents.93
" Lack of coverage for security deposits and utilities: FEMA does
not permit families to use the housing assistance to cover initial
security deposits or ongoing utility costs, unless they are
incorporated as part of the rent payments. 94 For low- or very
91. FEMA, TRANSITIONAL HoUsING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, http://www.fema.
gov/hazard/hurricane/2005katrina/katrinatranshousing.shtm (last visited Nov. 21,
2006).
92. NAT'L MULTI-HOUSING COUNCIL, HURRICANE HOUSING OVERVIEW:
SECTION 408
ASSISTANCE,
http://www.nmhc.org/Content/ServeContent.cfm?
ContentltemlD=3635#408 (last visited Nov. 26, 2006).
93. See supra notes 30 (loss of rental units), 61 (rent increases); see FISCHER &
SARD, supra note 85, at 5 ("FEMA has capped the amount of rental assistance it
provides -at the local Fair Market Rent (FMR), a standard that is set annually by
HUD. Evidence shows that rental assistance at the FMR level is insufficient in
some markets to enable families to rent an apartment, particularly in markets where
rental costs have risen sharply in recent months because the hurricanes substantially
reduced the stock of inhabitable rental housing, or because an influx of evacuees
seeking housing has pushed rental prices upward. Rental assistance that is limited to
the local Fair Market Rent level also is frequently inadequate for certain types of
households, such as people with disabilities who may need modestly more
expensive housing with special accommodations.").
94. 44 C.F.R. § 206.117(b)(1)(i)(C), (D) (2005) ("All utility costs and utility
security deposits are the responsibility of the occupant except where the utility does
not meter utility services separately and utility services are a part of the rental
charge.") ("The occupant is responsible for all housing security deposits."); FISCHER
& SARD, supra note 85, at 5; FEMA, Disaster Assistance Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.fema.gov/assistance/dafaq.shtm#34 (last visited Nov. 21,
2006) ("No, FEMA cannot pay utility bills."). In a short-lived victory for displaced
families, a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring FEMA to
pay amounts for utilities for all recipients of Temporary Housing Assistance under
the Section 408 program. Watson v. FEMA, 437 F. Supp. 2d 638, 651 (S.D. Tex.
2006). On September 6, 2006, the 5th Circuit vacated the injunction. Watson v.
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low-income families without savings or income after the storm,
covering those expenses posed a substantial burden at a time
when many needed all their resources for immediate
95
necessities, such as food, medical care, and other expenses.
Landlord Participation: Because the program is operated as a
cash subsidy paid to tenants (who then paid landlords)-rather
than using the existing subsidized housing models where the
government entity directly contracts with landlords for
payment-families experienced some difficulty getting
landlords to participate in the program.96 Landlords were
concerned about the security of their rental income and
independently might ask tenants to demonstrate an income level
three times the rent (a practice not uncommon in some rental
markets). Naturally, many low-income tenants found they were
refused rental even from landlords whose rent fell under
FEMA's cap. By contrast, HUD's Disaster Voucher Program
(available only to former residents of subsidized housing and
the homeless) was operated through local housing authorities,
their existing expertise and relationships with
drawing upon 97
local landlords.

FEMA, No. 06-20651 (5th Cir. Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://femaanswers.org/
images/c/cb/5thCir decisionWatson.pdf.
95. The failure to cover utilities has been addressed by a recent Stafford Act
reform bill. See infra at Part V.
96. One displaced woman complained that, regardless of the FEMA rent
subsidy, landlords were asking her to document that her income was independently
sufficient to support the rent (more specifically, that she earned three times the
monthly rent). Multiple telephone conversations with client (most recently Aug. 4,
2006).
97. See HUD, NOTICE PIH 2006-12: DISASTER VOUCHER PROGRAM (DVP)
OPERATING REQUIREMENTS 4 (2006) (describing Disaster Voucher Program),
availableat http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/publications/notices/06/pih2006-12.pdf.
"Under the DVP, the [local Public Housing Authority] assumes responsibility to not
only provide a monthly rent subsidy on behalf of the family, but also to actively
assist the family in locating an eligible unit." Id. "Under the DVP housing
assistance payments contract, the PHA pays a monthly rent subsidy directly to the
owner on behalf of the family." Id.
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b. Home Repair and Replacement
Another part of the IHP program provides assistance for
homeowners to repair or replace their homes. Limited to $5,200 for

repairs and $10,400 for replacement, these relatively low caps pose
particular problems for low-income homeowners who are less likely
to have additional resources to rely on and combine with FEMA or
insurance proceeds. 98 This program is also one of several systematic
ways that FEMA privileges higher-income families, specifically
homeowners, over renters.9 9 Indeed, through this IHP program,
98. This shortcoming has been corrected in a recent reform of the Stafford Act
governing FEMA assistance. See generally infra Part V. As noted above, during
the response to Hurricane Katrina, funds for home repair had been limited to $5,200,
while funds for home replacement were limited to $10,400. See 42 U.S.C.A. §
5174(c)(2)(C), (c)(3)(B) (West 2003). These dollar amounts are annually adjusted
for inflation. § 5174(c)(2)(C), (c)(3)(B). These internal caps could prove troubling
for homeowners if they lacked insurance or were underinsured. Specifically, the
internal caps meant low-income owners were more likely to face a gap in the
resources needed to repair their homes. However, the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act of 2007, signed into law Oct. 4, 2006, removed those
caps, meaning that homeowners could receive up to the overall cap on FEMA
assistance of $26,200. Dep't of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006) (Maximum Amount Under Individual Assistance
Programs) (striking internal caps on repairs and replacement formerly at 42
U.S.C.A. § 5174(c)(2)(C), (c)(3)(B)); 42 U.S.C.A. § 5174(h) (setting overall cap,
adjusted for inflation).
99. Not surprisingly, the average incomes of renters are lower than
homeowners. For the three coastal counties in Mississippi most impacted by
Katrina, the difference in median income is striking:
Hancock
Harrison
Jackson
TOTAL
$ 35,337
$ 35,502
$ 39,143
Owner
$ 39,116
$43,069
$ 44,959
Renter
$ 22,682
$ 25,668
$ 24,976
See U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Detailed Tables, HCT36. Median
Household Income in 1999 (Dollars) by Tenure, http://factfinder.census.gov/
servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&-state=dt&-context=dt&-dsname=DEC_2000SF4U&mtname=DEC_2000_SF4_UHCT036&-treeid=404&-redoLog--true&llgeo_
types=N&-_caller-geoselect&-geo id=05000US28045&-geo_id=05000US28047&geoid=05000US28059&-searchresults=04000US28&-format=&-_lang=en
(last
visited Nov. 26, 2006). In addition, minorities are more likely to be renters than
whites, meaning the distinction has racial significance.
See supra text
accompanying note 57.
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FEMA provides resources for rebuilding owner-occupied homes, but
there is no analogous FEMA program to provide funds dedicated to
the redevelopment of rental housing lost in the storm.' 00 Since the
effect of a disaster can significantly increase area rents, renters may
actually need more assistance than homeowners-not less-to replace
housing opportunities lost in a storm and to cope with subsequent
pressure on the rental market. 01 Indeed, anecdotal reports suggest
rents on Mississippi's Gulf Coast have increased by as much as
30%.102 But even if the issue is "ownership," the owners of the rental
property clearly lost their property just as those in owner-occupied
homes did. Notably, FEMA regulations bar the construction of any
"permanent housing" to assist renters, but home repair and
replacement assistance for owner-occupants is, by definition,
designated for rebuilding or replacement of permanent housing.'03
100. See Press Release, FEMA, Disaster Aid Scenarios (Oct. 21, 2005) ("The
owner of the apartment complex cannot receive a grant from FEMA for repairs to
the building because it is treated as a business."), available at
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease. fema?id= 19882.
101. In a different context-federal rebuilding funds for Gulf Coast statescitizens writing to the Biloxi Sun Herald argued that renters were not entitled to
assistance in the same manner as homeowners. See Gary W. Brown, Letter to the
Editor, Money To Rebuild Should Go to Property Owners, SuN HERALD (Biloxi),
Mar. 19, 2006 ("This money was intended to help homeowners rebuild, not to
benefit landlords who rent out homes for profit nor to give to people who had no
investment in the property in the first place. To me it sounds a lot like people trying
to get something for nothing ... ").
102. "Rents have soared about 25% to 30%, according to the Biloxi Ocean
Springs Assn. of Realtors." See Fausset supra note 30; RECOVERING STATES, supra
note 15, at 14 ("Housing shortages after a disaster have a tendency to inflate
rents .... ).
103. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.117(b)(4) (2005) (providing for "financial or direct
assistance to applicants for the purpose of constructing permanent housing in insular
areas outside the continental United States and in other remote locations when
alternative housing resources are not available and the types of financial or direct
temporary housing assistance described at paragraph (b)(1) of this section are
unavailable, infeasible, or not cost-effective") (emphasis added); 44 C.F.R. §
206.117(b)(3) ("FEMA may provide financial assistance under this paragraph to
replace the primary residence of an owner-occupied dwelling .... ") (emphasis
added). Though no such exception was made here, the rationale for this rule-to
permit permanent construction in areas where trailers or rental subsidies are likely to
be ineffective-seems well-suited to a catastrophic disaster such as Katrina. This
exception has been broadened by recent reform of the Stafford Act, which now
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c. OtherNeeds Assistance
FEMA also provides non-housing assistance to pay for other
disaster-related expenses and serious needs, such as replacement of
lost vehicles and damaged household items (appliances and
furnishings) and disaster-related medical expenses.' 0 4 However,
FEMA's procedures in awarding such assistance can exclude lowincome people. For example, benefits to replace vehicles lost in the
storm were allocated only to those who could demonstrate they
carried insurance on their vehicles (although such insurance almost
never covers losses from events such as Katrina).10 5 Since lowincome families disproportionately cannot afford or do not have such
insurance, such a policy, in effect, punishes them for being poor.
B. Barriersto Access: How FEMA procedures andpolicies limited
assistance to those most in need
The federal emergency response to this unprecedented natural
disaster suffered from abysmal planning and a lethargic response to
the needs of hurricane survivors in the devastated Gulf Coast.
Anecdotally, we knew the system had broken down when, ten days
after the storm, the Emergency Coordinator for Mississippi
Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) told us that he had not yet
seen or spoken to a FEMA representative. 0 6 When we asked where
we might be able to locate FEMA, he brusquely replied, "Your guess

permits funding of permanent and semi-permanent housing in many additional
areas, provided certain criteria demonstrating housing need are met. See infra Part
V for a full discussion of the changes.
104. See FEMA, HELP AFTERA DISASTER,supra note 33, at 5.
105. See Press Release, FEMA, Disaster Aid Scenarios (Oct. 21, 2005),
available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=19882 (applicant
"will need to provide proof of ownership and insurance information on the damaged

vehicle"). This car insurance requirement presents a typical instance in which
FEMA imposes a requirement but does not identify the requirement clearly for
applicants or advocates in its process. For example, this car insurance requirement
is not identified in FEMA's regulations or the materials provided to applicants. See,
e.g., 44 C.F.R. § 206.119(c)(2) (2005); FEMA, HELP AFTER A DISASTER, supra note
33.
106. Interview with Emergency Response Coordinator for MEMA, in Jackson,
Miss. (Sept. 8, 2005).
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is as good as mine." The only information we could locate at the
MEMA headquarters in Jackson was a list of ice delivery locations.
The next day, we drove from Jackson, Mississippi to Gulfport and
found hundreds of families gathering outside of makeshift emergency
shelters, isolated and unable to register with FEMA. Gulfport Mayor
Brent Warr announced, "We were literally
fending for ourselves,"
10 7
with no federal assistance on the horizon.
As we witnessed while assisting families at community legal
clinics in the days and months following the storm, applicants faced
several threshold barriers to even applying for emergency relief:
(1) FEMA eliminated paper applications, instead requiring
applicants to register with FEMA on-line or over the phone-in areas
where phone lines were frequently jammed and internet service either
down or non-existent for many low-income families;
(2) FEMA phone lines were overwhelmed with the sheer number
of calls and electronic applications, resulting in busy signals and
hours-long holds-even overnight;
(3) temporary workers hired to handle the deluge of calls were
poorly-trained, with limited knowledge of FEMA's unclear rules and
limitations; and
(4) the local DRCs were inaccessible to many low-income
families, particularly those without transportation.
The MeWaters H court recognized the emotional impact of these
bureaucratic roadblocks to recovery, stating "FEMA's indecision and
internal bureaucratic bumbling has strained even the most patient of
citizens."1 8 These immediate problems were further exacerbated by
procedural barriers to relief under FEMA's IHP, as well as the SBA
loan requirement. The interplay of registration problems and shifting
procedural requirements, resulted in long delays and unwarranted
denials of individual assistance for hurricane survivors-burdens
borne particularly by those with little or no resources of their own to
fall back on.

107. Sally Jenkins, Hook or by Crook, Surviving Storm, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,
2005, at Al.
108. McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 820 (E.D. La. 2006).
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1. A FlawedApplication Process
Families in coastal Mississippi suffered the consequences of a
political storm that arose from the lack of emergency preparedness.
Red Cross shelters in Mississippi opened a day before the disaster, but
the locations were at least 160 miles north of the Gulf Coast. 10 9
MEMA posted emergency evacuation routes, but offered no
transportation assistance out of coastal Mississippi. ° Without
adequate resources to evacuate-and no formal evacuation plan in
place-poor families were often resigned to wait out the storm in their
communities. The lower-income families who remained would have
to wait in the burgeoning queue of those attempting to apply for
emergency relief. This meant unregistered families would face even
longer delays in receiving a FEMA travel trailer or mobile home.111
Two weeks after the storm, we found that limiting registration to
the toll-free line and the internet made it nearly impossible for many
of our clients in coastal Mississippi to apply for FEMA emergency
benefits. Families calling from southern Mississippi area codes grew
tired of the operator's refrain, "All lines are temporarily busy due to
the storm." Only those outside of the disaster area had a chance of
reaching a live FEMA representative. Internet access was equally
limited. Thus, those with the ability to leave the area after disasteror, more specifically, families with the resources to temporarily
relocate outside the coast-registered more effectively. Volunteer

109. Lesly C. Simmons, Gulf CoastStates Preparefor HurricaneKatrina,AM.
RED CRoss, Aug. 27, 2005, http://www.redcross.org/article/0,1072,0_272_4467,
OO.html ("All Red Cross chapters in Mississippi north of Interstate 20 are opening

shelters tonight .... ").
110. See Press Release, MEMA, Evacuation Traffic Expected to Increase on
Interstates (Aug. 27, 2005).

111. Charles Craig, a FEMA spokesperson who participated in the Lawyers'
Committee legal clinic on October 27, 2005, noted that there was a backlog of
hundreds of families waiting on FEMA trailers in Mississippi. According to Mr.
Craig, the trailers were distributed according to the order of registration. When one
client responded that she registered a week after the storm and was still waiting for a
trailer, he told her that she should continue to wait and check in each week at the
local DRC. There was no way to confirm where she fell in the waiting list or how
long she would remain without a trailer. For the next several weeks, she continued
to live out of her car with her grandchildren. Interview with client, at Lawyers'
Committee Disaster Relief Legal Clinic, Gulfport, Miss. (Oct. 27, 2005).
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efforts began to fill the gap in disaster response; companies offered
free cell phones for registration,'1 2 while legal advocates helped
individuals in isolated communities complete the FEMA registration
process.
a. UnclearRules and Procedures
Families who were able to register with FEMA in the early fall
months following the storm often spoke with poorly-trained,
temporary workers faced with unclear rules and limitations." 3 The
lack of training and/or poor implementation of FEMA guidelines gave
FEMA operators broad discretion for unreviewed decisions. Mary
Price, for example, a renter in Gulfport, Mississippi, was told that she
was ineligible for IHP grant assistance until she filed her insurance
claims. "14
Perplexed, she told the operator that she had no
5
insurance."
It appeared that the name of her landlord had been
mistakenly entered as her insurance carrier.l 6 Similarly, Lucy Bell
was told she was not eligible to receive grant assistance until her
home had been inspected by FEMA.' ' 7 Yet, her entire street was
cordoned off by emergency workers, and she had no phone or postal
address, making it impossible for her to meet a FEMA inspector at the
place where her home once stood.' 18 Two months after the storm, she
and her family remained on a "camping" vacation, awaiting
emergency relief.
After hosting the first few legal clinics for hurricane survivors in
coastal Mississippi119--which included speaking to hundreds of
112. For example, Verizon Wireless donated several hundred cell phones to the
Lawyers' Committee for use in the Disaster Relief Legal clinics.
113. We experienced this both through the disaster relief legal clinics and
similar reports from pro bono attorneys who participated in client intake and FEMA
appeals cases.
114. Interview with client, at Lawyers' Committee Disaster Relief Legal
Clinic, Gulfport, Miss. (Oct. 27, 2005).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Interview with client, at Lawyers' Committee Disaster Relief Legal
Clinic, in East Biloxi, Miss. (Nov. 16, 2005).
118. Id.
119. The Lawyers' Committee hosted Disaster Relief Legal Clinics in Gulfport
on October 27, 2005, and December 14, 2005, and in Biloxi on November 16, 2005.
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FEMA representatives on the phone and in person-it became
apparent that, with FEMA, inconsistency is the rule, not the exception.
And discretion is likely to be used to the disadvantage of those least
informed of their legal rights, particularly families with limited
resources who lost personal records and had difficulty meeting
documentary requirements, such as proof of occupancy, damage,
personal property loss, and insurance coverage.
For example, in late April and early May 2006, FEMA sent about
500 notices summarily terminating trailer residents from the FEMA
trailers in Mississippi alone. 120 The thirty-day eviction notices did not
describe why families must leave, but rather cryptically attached a
FEMA determination noting that they were "ineligible" for other
FEMA benefits such as "rental assistance.''
In the face of confusing
and intimidating letters, many families simply gave up and moved out.
One trailer park manager reported
that over a third of her park moved
122
out after receiving the notices.
Families who waited several months to receive a FEMA trailer
were now threatened with the loss of that precious temporary housing.
They did not understand their rights to challenge the eviction. When
they received the trailer, they were told that they could remain in the
unit up to eighteen months, subject to recertification. 123 In part, the
confusion was due to the fact that notices were silent on the
occupants' rights, such as their ability to prove eligibility and recertify

120. Some 500 eviction notices were sent out, with a total of 3,000 notices
planned. (For reference, at the time, there were less than 40,000 trailers in
Mississippi.) See Dewan, supra note 12; Fausset, supra note 29. In May, pro bono
attorneys at Lawyers' Committee legal clinics helped six trailer residents respond to
termination notices from FEMA. In June, 2006, FEMA reversed course and the
hurricane survivors were not evicted. See Hammack, supra note 12; infra note 126
and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Letter from R. David Paulison, Acting Dir., Emergency
Preparedness & Response, FEMA, to Ms. [Brown] (Apr. 21, 2006) (on file with
authors).
122. Fausset, supra note 30. ("[T]hc manager[] said that about a third of the
park's 90-plus households had moved away in recent weeks. Most, she said, had
been scared off by the eviction notices.").
123. Press Release, FEMA, Recertification, What Does it all Mean? (Apr. 26,
2006) [hereinafter FEMA, Recertification], available at http://www.fema.gov/
news/newsrelease.fema?id=25560.
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under the grant program.1 24 Also, Mississippi landlord-tenant law tilts
so strongly against tenants, and provides them such little opportunity
25
for representation, that tenants rarely succeed in stopping evictions.1
Then, in June 2006, in response to a barrage of publicity and advocacy
from the Lawyers' Committee and others, FEMA suspended the
eviction of 3,000 Mississippi families from government-issued
26
trailers. 1
At the same time, even families who were not being threatened
with eviction from their trailers faced a cumbersome and often
contradictory administrative system.
FEMA's "recertification"
process 2-requiring applicants to establish their continuing
eligibility to remain in the trailer-created a mood of fear and
uncertainty. For example, one client signed a standard FEMA
Individuals and Households Program Occupant Dwelling Lease on
April 25, 2006, which expired just five days later.' 28 The lease stated
that, in order to remain in her trailer, she would have to renew the
FEMA lease every calendar month "subject to recertification of
continuing eligibility.' ' 129 This meant that in order to avoid an
eviction after May 1, she would have to enter into a new lease and
recertify. She signed the five-day lease agreement "under duress" and
came to our legal clinic fearing FEMA would evict her if she was not
present in her trailer if and when an inspector arrived for
recertification.130 Making matters worse, FEMA issued conflicting
124. See Letter from R. David Paulison to Ms. [Brown], supra note 121.
Notably, "[t]he letters gave the recipients 60 days to appeal the decision-but 30
days to get out of their trailers." Richard Fausset, FEMA Calls Off TrailerEvictions,
L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2006, at A4. Without a policy of staying evictions pending an
appeal, this provided little likelihood of relief, particularly since an appeal could
take far longer than 30 days to decide.
125. Mississippi Center for Justice, Gulf Coast Survey Results, 2-3 (2006) (on
file with author); see MCJ on the Post-Katrina Coast, supra note 64. According to
this survey of local landlord-tenant eviction proceedings conducted in 2006,
landlords received a judgment for eviction in 100% of cases where tenants were
unrepresented. Id.
126. See Fausset, supranote 30; Dewan, supra note 12.
127. See generally FEMA, Recertification, supra note 123.
128. See FEMA, Individuals and Households Program Occupant Dwelling
Lease (Apr. 25, 2006).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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long
statements on "recertification," sowing confusion as to how
1 31
remain.
to
do
must
they
what
or
trailers,
in
reside
could
families
Though there will always be practical problems with
administering temporary housing and verifying eligibility, these
problems were exacerbated in the FEMA context due to the
overwhelming number of policy decisions and guidelines that were
not transparentand accessible in a single, authoritative source so that
applicants (or even their attorneys) could correct errant decisions by
directing FEMA representatives to mistakes in their determinations.
Without transparency, it is difficult to ensure that FEMA workers,
applicants, and advocates are all playing by the same rulesheightening confusion and inconsistency.
b. Limited Access to DisasterRecovery Centers

Finally, hurricane survivors in disaster areas faced the problem of
limited access to the very DRCs designed as the staging areas for
FEMA's first responders. In Gulfport, Mississippi, the first FEMA
DRC did not permanently open until over a month after Katrina. The
opening of the DRC was announced September 16, but when we
drove a group of hurricane survivors to the location after September
22, we encountered a locked building with a posted sign that read:
131. In one notice, FEMA suggested recertification would occur every 60 to 90
days. See FEMA, Recertification, supra note 123 ("Depending on individual
circumstances, occupants will receive one on-site visit every 60 to 90 days at their
temporary home and many telephone follow-ups."). At the same time, as described
above, FEMA leases were issued indicating recertification would occur every
month. FEMA, Individuals and Households Program Occupant Dwelling Lease,
supra note 128. Finally, on July 26, in response to public outcry and efforts of
advocates, FEMA changed its policy so that all eligible evacuees who began in the
FEMA apartments or 403 housing program and transitioned to the 408 program only
had to certify one time prior to October 31, 2006. Memorandum from John
D'Araujo, Jr., Dir. of Recovery, FEMA, to Deputy Director for Gulf Coast
Recovery, re: Recertification Extensions (July 26, 2006), available at
http://www.femaanswers.org/images/9/90/Recertifmemo Jul26re403-408.pdf.
Compounding the conflicting information provided to individual applicants, FEMA
also recognized that "multiple and varying 403/408 communications [were] made to
State/local governments, landlords and individual evacuees .... ." Id. In other
words, different groups of evacuees were receiving different messages about
continuing assistance depending upon which type of assistance-Short-Term
Lodging (403) or Temporary Housing (408)-they were receiving. See id.
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"Temporarily closed due to storm."'1 32

The neighboring DRC in
Ocean Springs, Mississippi, opened quickly after the storm, but was
located over fifteen miles from the low-income and minority
neighborhoods in Gulfport.133 Without public transportation, most
families-who either did not have a car or lost their car in the storm34
could not reach a DRC outside of their immediate neighborhood.1
The obvious solution to the lack of access to DRCs in the hardest
hit disaster areas would include implementing a mobile DRC unit that
could travel extensively to neighborhoods and emergency shelters. As
the McWaters II court noted, "It defies reason that a federal agency
whose exclusive provision-and indeed, sole reason for existence-is
to assist fellow Americans in a time of natural disaster in meeting
their utmost needs wouldfail to notify people of the available services
and the requirements for engaging those services, in some clear,
consistent, and accessible way."'' 35
The Red Cross, volunteer
churches, and non-profit organizations stepped in to do the work of
immediate disaster relief in the low-income and minority
neighborhoods of Gulfport, Mississippi. 13 6 Yet, these grassroots

132. See Press Release, FEMA, Disaster Recovery Centers Open in Biloxi and
Gulfport
(Sept.
16,
2005),
available at http://www.fema.gov/news/

newsrelease.fema?id=19681; Press Release, FEMA, Threat of Hurricane Rita Forces
Temporary Closure of Disaster Recovery Centers in Gulf Coast Counties (Sept. 22,
2005), available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease .fema?id=19673.

133. See Press Release, FEMA, Disaster Recovery Centers Open in Ocean
Springs

and Pascagoula (Sept. 5,

2005), available at http://www.fema.gov/

news/newsrelease.fema?id= 18640.
134. The Insurance Information Institute estimates that 305,000 private
passenger auto claims arose from Katrina in Louisiana and Mississippi. See
INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, HURRICANE KATRINA: ONE YEAR LATER,

http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/additional/katrinalyear/ (last visited Nov. 25,
2006). In a major disaster, the problems of less-mobile populations are exacerbated.
Obviously, the elderly and disabled may have particular problems, especially if their
vehicles are damaged or destroyed. Lower-income families are less likely to have a
vehicle, and they have fewer vehicles per family member. See Yihua Liao, Vehicle
Ownership Patterns of American Households, UTC-UIC Information Brief IB-10B02, at 1 fig. 1, 3 tab.I (2002), http://www.utc.uic.edu/%7Efta/Information%20
Briefs/vehicles3.pdf.
135. Me Waters 11, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 820 (E.D. La. 2006).
136. See, e.g., Tony Pipa, Weathering the Storm: The Role of Local Nonprofits
in the Hurricane Katrina Relief Effort, in NONPROFIT SECTOR RESEARCH FUND

WORKING PAPER SERIES 1 (Aspen Institute 2006) ("find[ing] that small and

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006

35

California Western Law Review, Vol. 43 [2006], No. 1, Art. 4

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

efforts alone were insufficient without a parallel effort by FEMA to
link hurricane survivors in core disaster areas with individual disaster
assistance.
2. ParticularProceduralRoadblocks
a. SharedHouseholdRule
Application (or misapplication) of FEMA's "shared household
rule," which limits benefits on a per-"household" basis,137 was among
the most significant problems faced by families seeking assistance. At
our legal clinics, this was the single most common reason families we
assisted were determined ineligible or otherwise delayed in receiving
benefits. While rational in the abstract, in practice the rule created
significant harm to the families most in need of FEMA's assistance
after the storm.
Defining the household can be difficult, especially for low-income
families. In the abstract, the rule presumes that most households will
be easily defined, perhaps imagining a single nuclear family sharing
income, food, and household expenses.
But in reality, living
situations are regularly more complicated, the lines blurred. For brief
or extended periods of time, relatives or friends may live at the same
address, including a variety of scenarios where persons sublet or rent
rooms and/or "double up" in units when rent costs weigh heavily. A
variety of circumstances we encountered through our legal clinics thus
belie easy application of the "shared household" rule:
* After initially providing her with a trailer, FEMA denied Ms.
Smith's eligibility under the "shared household" rule. Prior to
Katrina, Ms. Smith resided with her adult sister, a homeowner,
and paid her sister $300 per month rent for the use of her
room. 138 Confirming their status as separate households,
medium-sized nonprofits and faith-based groups are vital to our nation's disaster
response infrastructure."), available at http://www.nonprofitresearch.org/usrdoc/
Nonprofits and Katrina.pdf.
137. 44 C.F.R. § 206.117(b)(1)(i)(A) (2005). "FEMA will include all
members of a pre-disaster household in a single registration and will provide
assistance for one temporary housing residence, unless the Regional Director or
his/her designee determines that the size or nature of the household requires that we
provide assistance for more than one residence." Id.
138. Telephone Interviews with Ms. [Jones] (May 2006). See also Letter from
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however, Ms. Smith's sister refuses to allow her to relet a room
in the house since she now intends to sell the home and move
out of state.139
* Before the storm, Ms. Jones, her fianc6, and their three-year-old
140
son rented a bedroom in her fiance's step-father's house.
Two other bedrooms were also rented by her prospective
brother-in-law and sister-in-law and their spouses and
children.14 1 In all, there were four "households" within the
same house, each functionally separate. 42 However, after
initially providing Ms. Jones with a trailer for her family,
FEMA subsequently declared her a "shared household" and
sought to evict her,1 43 which would have required her family of
three to share a trailer with her fianc6's step-father.
* For several months prior to the storm, Ms. Brown resided as a
live-in aide to provide care to her ailing ex-husband, who was
recovering from an amputation. 14 4 They maintained separate
Jonathan P. Hooks, Staff Attorney, Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Project, Lawyers' Comm.
for Civil Rights Under Law, to Mary Ellen Martinet, FEMA Trailer Div. (May 19,
2006) (on file with authors). We also heard of instances in which FEMA initially
denied assistance even to renters in completely separate units, if they shared an
address with their landlord.
139. Telephone Interviews with Ms. [Jones], supra note 138.
140. Id.; see also Letter from Jonathan P. Hooks to Mary Ellen Martinet, supra
note 138. As news coverage of Ms. Jones's case summarized:
But a number of residents said they were being kicked out erroneously, or
for technicalities that arise from gray areas in FEMA regulations. [Ms.
Jones]'s problem is one of the most common: FEMA officials told her she
was ineligible because someone from her previous residence had also
requested a trailer. [Jones] said her fiance's stepfather had indeed received
a FEMA mobile home-it is crammed with six people. But that doesn't
necessarily mean she can't have one. FEMA guidelines say the agency
"may consider" more than one housing application from extended families
who were living on one property before the storm.
Fausset, supra note 30.
141. Letter from Jonathan P. Hooks to Mary Ellen Martinet, supra note 138.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Telephone Interviews with Ms. [Brown] (May 2006); see also Letter from
Jonathan P. Hooks, Staff Attorney, Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Project, Lawyers' Comm.
For Civil Rights Under Law to Mary Ellen Martinet (May 15, 2006) (on file with
authors).
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households, living in different bedrooms and having their own
bank accounts.'14 Following Katrina, Ms. Brown evacuated
separately from her ex-husband, and subsequently relocated to
a FEMA trailer in D'Iberville, Mississippi, while her exhusband remained out of state. 146 In April 2006, however,
FEMA determined that Ms. Brown was ineligible under
FEMA's "shared household rule" and sought to evict her from
47
the trailer. 1
Many of our clients presented situations similar to these,
struggling either to get assistance in the first place or to continue to
receive temporary housing assistance after an initial check was issued.
While higher-income households might also have complicated living
arrangements, such complexities can often occur when lack of income
and savings push more low-income families into short- or long-term
dependence on friends and relatives for housing.
Unfortunately, in addition to the misapplication of the shared
household rule, FEMA's mishandling of the application process
compounded the problem. These issues often arose in piecemeal
fashion after the fact, with applicants often receiving confusing and
contradictory information from FEMA staff and members of extended
"shared households" being left to fend for themselves. Typically, we
would hear from an applicant who had initially been told to apply for
benefits separately from other residents at the same address--or where
FEMA never raised the "shared household" issue during the
application process. Then, later, the applicant would receive a notice
that they had been denied benefits since a member of the "shared
household" had earlier applied for and received benefits. Applicants
were commonly told by FEMA staff at a Disaster Recovery Center or
on the FEMA hotline to apply separately, only to have the decision
later reversed after the application was submitted. In addition,
FEMA's system flagged such applications as potential instances of
148
fraud, which could delay benefits for all applicants at that address.
145. Letter from Jonathan P. Hooks to Mary Ellen Martinet, supra note 138.
146. Telephone Interviews with Ms. [Brown], supra note 144; see also Letter
from Jonathan P. Hooks to Mary Ellen Martinet, supra note 144.
147. Letter from Jonathan P. Hooks to Mary Ellen Martinet, supra note 138;
see also Letter from R. David Paulison to Ms. [Brown], supra note 121.
148. See Press Release, FEMA, Do Not File Duplicate Disaster Assistance
Applications (Oct. 17, 2005) (stating that submitting more than one application
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Regardless, by denying the second applicant as ineligible under the
"shared household" rule, FEMA ultimately left it to the two applicants
to sort out the situation-in effect giving the first applicant total
discretion as to whether to share any benefits with the other persons
within the extended "shared household."
In the cases we saw, almost invariably the recipients of the
household's benefits were not in a position to "share" for a variety of
reasons. Without sufficient savings and with FEMA benefits barely
sufficient to cover ongoing needs, many low-income persons simply
could not afford to share the FEMA money.
Moreover, the denial of the second application also certainly
meant that the original application did not cover the full losses of the
entire "shared household." The first applicant, not considering the
other individual members of the same household, would not seek
sufficient housing assistance to provide shelter for the "shared
household." For example, the applicant would only seek a trailer
sufficient to house his or her portion of the household (and/or rental
assistance for a unit for those household members). In practice, this
meant that, although the second applicant was entitled to temporary
housing assistance as part of the "shared household," they received
nothing. Similarly, the first application would also not cover the full
losses of the household, since it omitted the personal property losses,
medical needs, or transportation losses of the other side of the
extended "shared household."
Defining a single household prior to the storm was difficult, but
situations became even more complex when pre-disaster households
were separated by the storm. 149 In addition to the physical separation
of families due to evacuation, many others either had to, or chose to,
live apart due to a variety of circumstances after the storm, such as
finding new employment in other areas or being near relatives or
"could delay processing of your application and receipt of your assistance"),
availableat http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease. fema?id= 19786.
149. See, e.g., Evelyn Nieves, Families Still Split Since Katrina,WASH. POST,
Oct. 27, 2005, at A5 (estimating there are "more than 1,500 cases of 'fractured
families' that have not been reunited, according to the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children"); see also Shaila Dewan et al., Evacuees' Lives Still
Upended Seven Months After Hurricane,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at A l (finding
that "blacks were more likely [than whites] to have been separated from family
members" after the storm).
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friends who were able to provide child or health care and financial or
emotional assistance. Of course, this did not even address instances
where familial, romantic, and other relationships were strained or
terminated by the stresses of Katrina, making it impossible to continue
to reside as a single household.' 50
However, FEMA practices failed to account for these
considerations. FEMA did not provide publicly-accessible rules or
exceptions that established when a pre-storm "shared household"
could legitimately be entitled to separate benefits.'15 Instead, it took
months for FEMA to even purport to modify its "shared household"
rule to correct one of its most obvious injustices-that it prevented
delivery of assistance to households that remained physically
15 2
separated in different cities or states as a result of the evacuation.
In practice, advocates encountered regular breaches of the purported
153
policy and FEMA staff who were unfamiliar with the new rule.

150. FEMA's failure to establish clear exceptions for these contexts could have
a disparate impact on women, particularly women with children. First, it creates
serious economic pressure to remain in a single household regardless of how
unhealthy the relationship may be, particularly for children. In addition, it gives
enormous economic power to the applicant receiving the FEMA benefits,
particularly the power to withhold housing assistance and funds for replacement of
personal property and the like from other adults in the household. For these reasons,
this situation is open to abuse.
151. In testimony during the McWaters case, FEMA purported to provide
exceptions for applicants who were renting separate units to house the families.
McWaters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 822 (E.D. La. 2006). However, FEMA
employed specious and circular logic to conclude that if families could not afford to
rent separate units to house the split household, then they were in effect a single
household. Id. Of course, this meant that only families with resources to advance
rent costs could take advantage of this opportunity to "establish" themselves as
separate households after the storm. Id. at 822 n.37.
152. See id at 821 ("FEMA recognized that in many cases those displaced by
Katrina were separated during evacuation and were unable, for a variety of reasons,
to re-connect after the Storm, and as such, the agency claims it modified its
assistance policies accordingly, in effect providing separate assistance to different
members of a single pre-disaster household who were separated post-Katrina.").
153. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.a.
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b. The SBA Loan Application Requirement

In addition to the denials addressed above, a major factor creating
extensive delays for so many families was the federal requirement
that, prior to being considered for FEMA grant assistance, virtually all
families seeking benefits must apply for a loan from the Small
This
Business Administration Disaster Home Loan Program.
requiring
by
expenditures
disaster-related
procedure limited federal
assistance to do so through a
those who could afford to repay disaster
154
subsidized loan rather than a grant.
As discussed below, FEMA's loan application requirement was
implemented poorly on a policy level, creating confusion and delay.
Moreover, FEMA's imposition of the requirement itself was illegal.
As the McWaters I court held in December 2005, the Stafford Act
governing FEMA benefits expressly forbids conditioning housing
Unfortunately,
on
SBA loan applications. 155
assistance
notwithstanding the court's decision and order, FEMA continued to
issue news releases confusing the public, applicants, and some
154. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.119(a)(1)-(3) (2005) ("To qualify for assistance
under this section, an applicant must also: (1) Apply to the United States Small
Business Administration's (SBA) Disaster Home Loan Program for all available
assistance under that program; and (2) Be declined for SBA Disaster Home Loan
Program assistance; or (3) Demonstrate that the SBA assistance received does not
satisfy their total necessary expenses or serious needs arising out of the major
disaster.").
155. McWaters I, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 232 (E.D. La. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
5174(a)(2)) ("' [A]n individual or household shall not be denied assistance under
paragraph (1) [Temporary Housing] . . . of subsection (c) [Types of Housing

Assistance] solely on the basis that the individual or household has not applied for
or received any loan or other financial assistance from the Small Business
Administration or any other Federal agency."') (alteration in original). Technically,
the statute "only" bars FEMA from imposing the loan requirement on applicants for
housing assistance. FEMA does offer other related programs, such as home repair
funding and "other needs assistance." McWaters I, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 232; see also
42 U.S.C.A. § 5174(c) (West 2003) (describing the types of housing assistance that
is available to disaster victims). In practice, however, the distinction is irrelevant,
since FEMA did not provide temporary housing assistance while the loan process
was purportedly imposed for other benefits-and did not clarify for applicants that
the application was not required in any event. See McWaters I, 408 F. Supp. 2d at
232 ("FEMA has also not made it clear that even if Other Needs Assistance is
sought, one may still receive the Temporary Housing Assistance in the meantime or
without applying for an SBA loan.").
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advocates about the loan requirement. 156 In June 2006, the Mc Waters
157
H court condemned such confusing tactics.
The SBA requirement caused numerous problems for many of the
families most in need. First, complying with the requirement was
confusing for many applicants. While in some cases FEMA operators
or staff explained the basis for the requirement, not all applicants
understood that they were required to submit a loan application,
particularly to the SBA, to receive emergency help after a disaster. As
a result, those that did not complete the application rendered
themselves ineligible for assistance.
The complexity of the
application itself could pose problems for families with limited
reading or literacy skills.
But mostly, for the vast majority of families in need-those for
whom the SBA loan program was plainly unaffordable and thus
inappropriate-the procedural requirement was perverse. Many did
not understand that it was in their best interest to be denied for the
very loans they were required to apply for, and be denied as quickly as
possible, since this would return them to FEMA where they could
begin to be considered for FEMA's grant program.
In addition to confusion, the requirement introduced significant
delay into the process of receiving benefits-delay which weighed
more heavily on those without immediately available resources.
Some seven months after the disaster, in February 2006, almost 20%
of the applicants referred to FEMA for assistance remained
156. Press Release, FEMA, SBA Loan Application Necessary for Assistance
(Feb. 13, 2006). As the title of FEMA's press release indicates, it misleadingly gave
the impression that an SBA loan application was necessary for housing assistance
when in fact FEMA could not, by law, impose such a requirement.
157. McWaters I, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 823 (E.D. La. 2006). Though the issue
was not squarely presented to the court since a motion for contempt was not filed,
the court nonetheless noted:
[S]uch a release, with its confusing and incorrect headline, and technical
emphasis on 'other programmatic assistance' appearing only in the text of
the release, certainly seems to violate the spirit of the Court's Order, if not
its literal terms ....
The Court finds it highly probable that most citizens
affected by a disaster will not know the difference between 'housing
assistance,' 'other needs assistance,' 'other programmatic assistance' and
the like. It was this confusion that the Court's original Order meant to
address, but apparently it still remains.
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unprocessed, totaling approximately 94,800 households out of
500,700 referred to SBA.158 Naturally, several months of delay would
test even the resources of households with relatively strong savings.
While some delay is understandable with any administrative
process, FEMA and SBA's administrative policy here appears to have
exacerbated the delay by failing to efficiently screen out obviously
financially ineligible households. SBA uses an undisclosed income
level to summarily decline applicants who could not afford to repay
the SBA loan. In this disaster, 101,200 applicants out of 500,700 (just
over 20%) were summarily declined in this manner. 5 9 But since less
than one in five applicants, only 96,100,160 were ultimately approved
for loans, the income bar appears to be set far too low, creating an
administrative burden for SBA to review and process too many
ineligible families-while simultaneously delaying assistance to those
most in need.
In addition, FEMA further complicated matters by failing to
require the submission of income data by applicants to expedite the
SBA loan application process. Because income was not a "required
field" in the FEMA application process, and because many applicants
were never told of the significance of failing to provide an income
158. According to a confidential source at the SBA, the following numbers
(rounded) reflect the disposition of SBA loan applications as of February, 2006:
Loan Applications Received
399,500
Applications Summary Declined
101,200
TOTAL number of applications received 500,700
DISPOSITION of applications
Declined (Summary Declined +
Applications Declined)
258,400
51.61%
Withdrawn
51,400
10.26%
Approved
96,100
19.19%
Applications Still in Process
94,800
18.93%
Memorandum from Jonathan P. Hooks submitted to Office of Senator Joseph
Lieberman, Ranking Member of the Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs
Comm. (Mar. 24, 2006) (on file with authors); see also Bill Walsh, SBA Frustrated
in Delivery of DisasterRelief Loans Approved, but Conditions Must Be Met, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 10, 2006, at 4 ("The SBA continues to be criticized
for its high loan-rejection rate. Of 201,775 applications, 49,153 have been
approved-meaning three out of four applicants are denied.").
159. See Hooks, supranote 158.
160. Id.
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level, applicants who did not complete it were automatically referred
for full application review by the SBA. 16 1 Leaving the income
question blank was not uncommon. Many applicants were confused
by the inquiry, since it was not clear whether they were to report their
pre-disaster income, their momentary income as of the time of the
application, or some projected income they anticipated receiving after
the disaster had passed.
In short, the loan application requirement created serious
confusion that postponed the delivery of relief and exacerbated the
difficulties faced by those who had the fewest resources in reserve.
c. Insurance
Having homeowners' insurance could also result in significant
confusion and delays of benefits, which were particularly troublesome
for low-income homeowners. Under law and FEMA regulations
prohibiting duplication of benefits, FEMA will not provide assistance
to families who are eligible for other benefits, including homeowners'
insurance.1 62 Typically, this meant that FEMA required applicants to
exhaust insurance benefits before turning to FEMA for assistance.
Unfortunately, particularly after Katrina, families waiting to settle
insurance disputes could remain without FEMA assistance for a
significant period of time, for several reasons. First, some policy
holders were stuck in a widespread dispute over whether the damage
from Katrina was covered by typical homeowners' policies that do not
cover flood damage, 163 specifically, whether the "storm surge" from
161. See Transcript, Nat'l Low-Income Housing Coal., Call to Discuss the
SBA's Role in Recovery (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.nlihc.org/news/
010406katrinacall.pdf ("They decline to give that information so they're
automatically sent to SBA.").
162. 42 U.S.C. § 5155(a) (2000); 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.110(h), 206.113(a)(2)
(2005).
163. In Mississippi alone, several class actions were filed disputing the extent
of loss covered by various homeowners' insurance policies. See, e.g., Class Action
Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Relief, Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 1:05CV436 LG-RHW, (S.D. Miss. 2006) (purported class of Mississippi
homeowners with property in the path of Hurricane Katrina); Class Action
Complaint on Contract of Insurance, Guice v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No.
1:06CV1LG-RHW, (S.D. Miss. 2006) (purported class of homeowners and residents
of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson Counties who owned State Farm home
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Katrina was classified as flood or wind damage. 164 In addition, some
policyholders had individualized disputes over whether their loss was
caused by flood or wind.165 Finally, the sheer volume of claims
delayed the process.' 66 For the lowest-income homeowners, the
delays were more difficult, increasing the pressure
on them to accept
1 67
inadequate settlement offers from their insurers.'
FEMA, however, could have eliminated the delays these families

insurance policies ).
164. Guice v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV1-LTS-RHW, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 57571, at *11 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 14, 2006).
165. News reports have also indicated that one of the largest insurers, State
Farm, may have tried to fraudulently reduce its loss by hiding reports indicating that
some losses were due to covered wind damage, not floodwaters. See Anita Lee,
GrandJuries Looking at State Farm, SUN HERALD (Biloxi), Sept. 28, 2006, at Al.
166. See, e.g., Dean Starkman & Albert B. Crenshaw, Homeowners Wait for
Claims To Be Adjusted, Industry Chokes on Volume of Work, WASH. POST, Sept. 29,
2005, at DI ("Some 10,000 insurance adjusters are deploying in the Gulf Coast
region to handle more than 1 million claims expected to result from Katrina and
Rita. But their progress has been slowed by their inability to inspect houses in
inaccessible sections of the disaster areas and by the sheer bulk of the claims....
[F]or now, claims-handling is the most pressing issue for policyholders. While some
homeowners report prompt service under difficult circumstances, others complain of
busy signals, unreturned calls and dangling claims waiting for an insurance
adjuster's visit. Irate homeowners have flooded insurance departments with
complaints about claims denied on the basis of the flood exclusion."); Dean
Starkman, The Legal Storm in Katrina's Wake; Battles over Insurance Claims Begin
to Clog Gulf Coast Dockets, Spill into State Legislatures, WASH. POST, Aug. 30,
2006, at Dl ("[A]cross the Gulf Coast ....
more than a million policyholders have
turned to their insurers for payment on homeowner's, commercial and other
insurance claims. Battles over claims have clogged state and federal courts here and
spilled into state legislatures."); Joseph B. Treaster, Tempers Flareas Agents Assess
Storm's Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A16 ("[M]any homeowners are still
waiting for a first contact from their company and others haggle with agents and
adjusters over whether water or wind flattened their home and how much, if
anything, their policies will pay.").
167. Compared to whites, minorities were statistically more likely to accept
low settlement offers, rather than dispute them. See Rukmini Callimachi & Frank
Bass, Study: Whites Pursued Katrina Insurance Claims More Aggressively,
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 25, 2006, at El ("Though poor and minority
neighborhoods suffered the brunt of Katrina's fury, residents living in white
neighborhoods have been three times as likely as homeowners in black
neighborhoods to seek state help in resolving insurance disputes, according to an
Associated Press computer analysis.").
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faced by using its broad authority to extend benefits pending receipt of
insurance proceeds.1 68 Indeed, under its regulations and public
information guides, in the event of delays exceeding thirty days,
FEMA may provide assistance to insured applicants, though the
payment must be repaid to the extent the loss is covered by
insurance. 169 Unfortunately, in practice, FEMA frequently failed to
use this discretion to assist low-income households. Numerous clients
at our legal clinics found that their applications were being delayed or
denied (i.e., awarded $0) on the basis that insurance claims were
pending--even through the later spring and summer of 2006. That so
many applicants continued to be denied or delayed benefits, when
FEMA had established authority and discretion to assist them, spoke
volumes about the extent to which FEMA encouraged or supported its
staff in meeting the needs of applicants.
Indeed, FEMA's form determination letters in this regard
reflected its penchant for obfuscating available benefits and
assistance, thus further discouraged applicants from pursuing
available benefits.17 ° Specifically, in describing why applicants with
168. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5155(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 109-279)
("This section shall not prohibit the provision of Federal assistance to a person who
is or may be entitled to receive benefits for the same purposes from another source if
such person has not received such other benefits by the time of application for
Federal assistance and if such person agrees to repay all duplicative assistance to the
agency providing the Federal assistance.").
169. FEMA, HELP AFTER A DISASTER, supra note 33, at 10 (assistance may be
provided "[ijf a decision on your insurance settlement has been delayed longer than
30 days from the time you filed the claim"); see also 44 C.F.R. § 206.110(h)(1)
(2005) (FEMA will provide assistance if "[p]ayment of the applicable benefits are
significantly delayed"); 44 C.F.R. § 206.113(a)(3) (2005) (FEMA will provide
assistance "when the insured individual or households' insurance proceeds have
been significantly delayed through no fault of his, her or their own, and the applicant
has agreed to repay the assistance to FEMA or the State from insurance proceeds
that he, she or they receive later"); 44 C.F.R. § 206.116(a) (2005) (requiring
repayment).
170. The full text of FEMA's form letter pertaining to insurance denials
provides:
Applicants with Insurance: Your application for assistance may be placed
on hold to allow you time to file your insurance claim. Federal law
prohibits FEMA or the State from duplicating assistance that may be
available from insurance. A $0 amount listed above does not necessarily
mean that you are ineligible for assistance. It means that FEMA needs to
know the amount of your insurance settlement and your unmet needs
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insurance were denied benefits, the letters did not notify them of the
opportunity to seek benefits subject to repayment once insurance
claims were settled. 7 ' To the contrary, the letter suggested that an
applicant must know the amount of their insurance settlement before
FEMA would further process the application, implying that benefits
were denied until that time.172 If anything, the letter could leave the
1 73
confusing impression that the applicant was denied altogether.
d. Insufficient Damage/InspectionProcess
Finally, a common factor for a delay or denial of FEMA
assistance was a finding of insufficient damage by a FEMA inspector.
In some instances, FEMA simply ignored satellite mapping images:
[Molly Devans] is a 74-year-old, disabled woman who lost
everything when Katrina destroyed her apartment. Initially, FEMA
denied that she had any damage, even though her home had been in
an area that FEMA's observation satellites determined to be a "total
loss." Eventually, after [Molly] got a pro bono lawyer [through the
Lawyers' Committee's FEMA Appeals project], FEMA admitted
that her home really was in the "geospatially-determined-total-loss"
before we can process your application further.
Letter from R. David Paulison, Acting FEMA Dir., Emergency Preparedness &
Response (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://www.probono.net/ms/fema.cfm
(follow "Complete Sample Intake (prepared by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law)" hyperlink).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. FEMA's own press releases confirm that it knew its language was likely
to sow confusion. Indeed, the titles of the releases themselves recognize that the
letters would be construed as "denial letters." See, e.g., Press Release, FEMA,
FEMA Denial Letter May Not Mean Denial of Assistance, (Oct. 23, 2005) ("Any
applicant who receives a letter from FEMA stating that a claim for federal assistance
has been denied because of insurance coverage should contact his/her insurance
agent and request a 'delay of settlement' letter."), available at http://www.
fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=19982; Press Release, FEMA Denial Letters
May Not Be Last Word, (Jan. 7, 2006) ("Those who receive denial letters from
FEMA deeming them ineligible because of insurance may later receive assistance"
by submitting appropriate paperwork) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=22238. Unfortunately, FEMA did
not correct this confusing language in its form letter. Thus, the same language
continued to be sent to applicants throughout the disaster.
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zone, but declined to compensate her because they needed "some
time" to figure out the value of her total loss.
Week in, week out, FEMA and [Molly]'s lawyer [debated] the
"value of loss issue." Every week, FEMA asked her lawyer to "be
patient" and suggested that they call back "next week." This
continued for 8 weeks. [Then in July], without much patience,
[Molly]'s lawyer insisted that FEMA send a good-faith payment
while their valuation team worked things out. They said they'd
look into it. Four days later, [Molly]
received a $10,019.63 check
74
(without any explanatory letter). 1
Another problem was the delay and difficulty associated with
coordinating a formal FEMA inspection. For example, several clients
in our FEMA appeals project received a FEMA eviction notice, citing
"withdrawn-no contact" as the reason for eviction. 75 We met one
client, Fred Parks, at his trailer, where he showed us his letter. 17 6 Mr.
Parks was particularly distraught because he was illiterate and had to
177
rely on his sister for an explanation of his temporary housing status.
Mr. Parks clung to his front porch in Gautier during the storm, while
the winds and rain destroyed his rental home. 178 After living out of
his car for months, he received a FEMA trailer only to be subject to an
imminent eviction. 179 He told us that a FEMA inspector called his
sister (Mr. Parks remains without a phone line) to arrange a FEMA
inspection, but the inspector cancelled the appointment. 8 ° Now, he
was facing an eviction because FEMA had not completed a formal

174. Press Release, Lawyers' Comm. For Civil Rights Under Law, Stories
Ongoing, One Year Later (Aug. 16, 2006) (on file with authors).
175. See, e.g., Letter from R. David Paulison, Acting Dir., Emergency
Preparedness & Response, FEMA to Mr. [Parks] (Jan. 16, 2006) (on file with
authors).
176. Id.
177. Interview with Mr. [Parks], in Gautier, Miss., (May 18, 2006). Mr. Parks
had to have his sister write a letter to FEMA on his behalf. See Letter from Ms.
[Parks] to FEMA (May 21, 2006) (on file with authors).
178. Id.
179. Interview with Mr. [Parks], supra note 177.
180. Id.; see Letter from R. David Paulison, Acting Dir., Emergency
Preparedness & Response, FEMA to Mr. [Parks] (May 3, 2006) (on file with
authors).
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inspection. 181 We called FEMA on his behalf several times and were
ultimately assured that the eviction would be withdrawn and an
inspector would be sent out to his former home. Fred Parks is only
one of the many eligible disaster survivors who faced a denial based
on a hasty or erroneous finding of insufficient damage.
V. ADVOCACY AND REFORM

A. Recent Stafford Act Improvements
Drawing upon the maddening experience of Mr. Parks and other
low-income families denied benefits by FEMA or facing delays and
confusion in the process, we and other advocates urged
comprehensive reform of the law governing FEMA benefits.
Overcoming FEMA's shortcomings, unfortunately, requires more than
impact litigation to hold FEMA to its existing legal and constitutional
duties or individual representation to address mishandling of
particular applications. It requires substantial reform of FEMA's
governing statute to eliminate barriers and improve FEMA's
responsiveness to the needs of applicants, especially those with low
incomes. Fortunately, some provisions revising the Stafford Act,
which governs FEMA benefits, were included when, on October 4,
2006, the President signed the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2007 into law. 82 While advocates still have
much to do, these Stafford Act reforms are a welcome change.
Beyond substantial organizational overhaul and revisions of
FEMA's disaster response, particular provisions corrected some of the
substantive problems identified above. First, on rental assistance, the
Stafford Act was changed to explicitly allow families to use cash
assistance to pay for security deposits and utility bills.' 83 This
181. Interview with Mr. [Parks], supra note 177.
182. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, PL 109295, 120 Stat. 1355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
183. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, §
689d(1)-(2), 120 Stat. at 1452, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §
5174(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 109-367, excluding P.L. 109-304,
P.L. 109-351, P.L. 109-364 to P.L. 109-366 )) (providing that housing assistance
"may include the payment of the cost of utilities, excluding telephone service," as
well as the cost of "security deposits"). Whether pre-existing law required FEMA to
allow applicants to use assistance for utilities had been litigated in Watson. See
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eliminates a significant barrier faced by low-income families who had
difficulty making effective use of the assistance if they lacked the
income to cover these ancillary costs.
In addition, the reform bill recognized that, where a substantial
share of rental housing had been destroyed, FEMA funds should be
made available to provide longer-term, more permanent housing
solutions for renters. As noted above, this reform corrects a
preference which formerly limited available funds for improving the
permanent housing stock to owner-occupied dwellings only. Two
changes address this need. First, the Stafford Act was amended to
authorize FEMA to provide semi-permanent or permanent housing to
displaced households when alternate housing resources were not
available.' 84 Previously, such funding for permanent rental housing
resources had been limited to insular or remote areas. 185 This
provision gives FEMA the flexibility to support efforts to replenish
rental stock depleted by a disaster and related rent increases.
Second, the appropriations bill authorized a pilot program to make
better use of existing rental housing located in disaster areas as a
means of "provid[ing] timely and cost-effective temporary housing
assistance." 186 Under the pilot program, FEMA (or agencies it funds)
may enter into lease agreements for displaced households with owners
of multi-family rental property in disaster areas and make repairs to
these properties. 87 This provides a mechanism to quickly repair
supra note 94.

184. See § 685(1)-(2), 120 Stat. at 1447, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §
5174(c)(4) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 109-367, excluding P.L. 109-304, P.L. 109351, P.L. 109-364 to P.L. 109-366 )) (striking the restriction on funding "permanent

housing construction" to only "remote" locations and permitting such construction
in any location where "no alternative housing resources are available" and FEMA's
temporary housing assistance is "unavailable, infeasible, or not cost-effective").
185. § 685, 120 Stat. at 1447.
186. § 689i(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 1454 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C.A. §
776(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 109-367, excluding P.L. 109-304, P.L. 109351, P.L. 109-364 to P.L. 109-366)) ("The pilot program shall be designed to make

better use of existing rental housing, located in areas covered by a major disaster
declaration, in order to provide timely and cost-effective temporary housing
assistance to individuals and households eligible for assistance under section 408 of
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C.
5174) where alternative housing options are less available or less cost-effective.").
187. § 689i(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), 120 Stat. at 1454 (codified as amended at 6
U.S.C.A. § 776(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 109-367, excluding
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salvageable rental units while at the same time allowing FEMA,
through leases, to ensure that repaired units are available to lowerincome households.
B. Significant Reform Remains Necessary
However, additional significant statutory and regulatory reforms
can and should still be made to make FEMA's programs more
effective for all households affected by a disaster. For example,
several reforms were included in one of the versions of the bill that the
Senate passed, Senate Bill 3721, but the reforms were not included in
the final legislation.' 88 Among other things, the Senate bill corrected
the "shared household" rule problems in part, expressly authorizing
assistance to be provided separately to different members of a predisaster household for reasons of divorce, family separation, domestic
violence, or "other good cause."' 189 The Senate version also proposed
to expedite adjustment to the amount of rental assistance to facilitate
its use in "extraordinary circumstances"
where fair market rents
190
dramatically increased after the storm.
At a minimum, we urge FEMA and Congress to explore ways to
address the shortcomings identified in this article. Central reforms
would include changes to better address "shared household" rule
problems and to ease and clarify grounds for permitting persons who
formerly shared an address to obtain appropriate benefits and
temporary housing after a disaster.
Procedurally, reform should focus on introducing clarity and
consistency into the process. As highlighted in the discussion above,
one of the most critical failings of FEMA is the confusing and opaque
nature of benefits provided and procedural rights available to each
disaster survivor applying for assistance. Certainly, FEMA and/or
Congress could seek to establish clearer rules to ensure that in each
disaster, applicants are adequately apprised of their rights. However,

P.L. 109-304, P.L. 109-351, P.L. 109-364 to P.L. 109-366)) (permitting FEMA to
"enter into lease agreements with owners of multi-family rental property" and to
"make improvements to properties under such lease agreements").
188. See S. 3721, 109th Cong. (as reported with an amendment, Aug. 3, 2006).
189. S. 3721, § 218(a).
190. S. 3721, § 218(b).
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FEMA's unresponsiveness to the needs of so many families may be
related to something even more fundamental.
We firmly believe a significant reason FEMA has failed to
provide such procedural clarity is because it so adamantly resists
providing individual households with any enforceable procedural
rights-refusing to even concede that Constitutional Due Process
standards govern disaster relief as they do all other federal action.191
The adversarial process, while not perfect, is an effective way of
bringing to the attention of agencies-and courts-ways in which
programs fall short for those they are intended to serve. At minimum,
the Stafford Act should be amended to permit federal court
jurisdiction for evacuees to sue FEMA where rights guaranteed by the
Stafford Act and the Declaration of an Emergency have been denied.
Indeed, recognizing and incorporating such a process could lead to
greater clarity and efficiency in disaster relief.
Imagine for a moment that FEMA provided a single, clear
statement of the benefits available and the procedural rights accorded
to victims after each disaster, including an open appeals process with
clear statements informing applicants of the basis used for rejecting
their claims. Rather than being a burden, such clear statements would
provide applicants with the information needed to more expeditiously
resolve or, where appropriate, abandon their requests for disaster
assistance. Indeed, far too many of the cases described above
involved significant time spent by FEMA operators reviewing unclear
case files or by appeals branch staff reviewing appeals where the basis
for denial was unclear-to say nothing of the time and effort spent by
advocates trying to resolve simple mistakes. Further, a clear, public
statement of available benefits and procedures would allow for
significantly greater ease in correcting erroneous determinations by
individual FEMA staff members who incorrectly applied its policies.
Finally, because it also requires justifying policies and procedures
in an open forum, the adversarial process could quickly correct some
of FEMA's most troubling procedures. For example, if FEMA was
forced to consider its actions in light of due process standards, it
would likely not have issued trailer eviction notices that required

191. See Mc Waters II, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 812 (E.D. La. 2006) ("Essentially
defendants argue that under the aegis of sovereign immunity, FEMA may commit
unconstitutional acts and not be subject to any judicial review.").
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needy families to vacate their trailers while their appeals were
pending. While such change would not be easy, it would be vital to
better ensure that FEMA assistance meets the needs of those with the
fewest resources to support themselves after a disaster.
Hurricane Katrina reminded those who had forgotten that
America still has far to go to fully include many of its citizens,
especially the poorest, in its promise. After the hurricane, President
Bush expressed the eagerness of many to overcome this unfortunate
history: "There's ...deep, persistent poverty in this region ...[with]
roots in a history of racial discrimination, which cut off generations
from the opportunity of America. We have a duty to confront this
poverty with bold action.'1' 92 It should not require the searing images
from August 2005--or the barren landscape still present in much of
the Gulf Coast-to take this call to action seriously. Ensuring that
government assistance is effectively designed to serve all people,
regardless of differences in income, race, sex, or disability, is one
obvious way to begin.

192. Michael A. Fletcher, Bush's Poverty Talk Is Now All but Silent: Aiding
Poor Was BriefPriorityAfter Katrina, WASH. POST July 20, 2006, at A4.
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